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COMMENT
IMPACT OF THE AGENCY SHOP ON LABOR
RELATIONS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
The measure of responsibility with which unions act is particularly
important in the public sector, where collective bargaining is still emerging and has not been met with universal acceptance. Attitudes with
which unions approach the problems of labor relations in public employment often reflect the degree of security they enjoy; labor peace
is jeopardized if the majority representative of public employees cannot
achieve financial and organizational security.1 One desirable way to
enhance union responsibility is to adopt an appropriate form of union
security agreement. 2 Such arrangements prevent the nonunion employee
1 Gromfine, Union Security Clauses in Public Employment, BNA GOV'T EMPLOYEE
REL. REP. No. 204: E-l, E-2 (July 7, 1969).
2 Classification of the major union security arrangements includes the following:
a. Closed Shop. The employer and union agree that all workers must belong
to the union to keep their jobs, and when hiring new workers, the employer
will hire only members of the union.
b. Union Shop. Although the employer can hire whom he wants, members or
nonmembers, the workers he hires must join the union within a certain time
limit or be discharged.
c. Modified Union Shop. The employer agrees that all present and future
members of the union shall maintain their union membership for the duration
of the contract as a condition of continued employment. Present employees who
are not members of the union and who do not join the union in the future may
retain employment without ever joining the union. The employer further agrees
that new employees must join the union within a specified period of time or
lose their jobs.
d. Maintenance of Membership. The employer agrees that all present and future
members of the union must remain members of the union for the life of the
contract so providing as a condition of continued employment. Employees who
are not members of the union and who do not join the union in the future may
continue employment without union membership.
e. Agency Shop. The employer and union agree that no employee shall be forced
to join or remain a member of the union as a condition of employment. If an
employee opts for nonmembership, he must tender to the union a sum equivalent
to union dues. This sum represents a fee charged him by the union for acting
as his agent in collective bargaining and in the administration of the collective
bargaining agreement.
See LABOR LAw GRoup TRusT, LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAw 633-85 (3d ed. 1965);
Hopfl, The Agency Shop Question, 49 CORNEL. L.Q. 478 (1964).
In private employment the right to bargain for a closed shop is generally prohibited.
E.g., 29 US.C. § 158(a)(8) (1964); 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1964). Collective bargaining
over a union shop only is protected conditionally by federal statute; the right-to-work or
local-option clause of the Taft-Harfley Act (29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964)) permits the states
to prohibit such agreements, and several states have done so. See note 81 and accompanying text infra. Inasmuch as the union shop permitted by the Taft-Hartley Act conditions
continued employment only on the payment of union dues and fees, the agency shop is
the practical equivalent of the union shop. NLRB v. GMC, 373 US. 734, 744 (1963).
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from sharing in the benefits resulting from union activities without
also sharing in the obligations.3 In addition, the security agreement
stabilizes the bargaining relationship by providing security from attack
by rivals and enables union leaders to devote more attention to bargaining and administration of collective agreements. 4
The suggestion that union security is a necessary, preliminary step
toward peaceful and productive labor relations in the public sector
leaves unresolved which type of union security arrangement is best able
to accommodate the conflicting considerations inherent in public employment labor relations. These considerations include: (1) security of
and financial support for the bargaining representative; (2) freedom of
dissenting or objecting employees; and (3) encroachment on the sovereign powers and operations of government.
Of the most common forms of union security, 5 the closed shop
seems as unreasonable an objective for public employee unions as it
is in private employment.0 Its application in the public sector would
cause government to transfer its hiring power to the union, in opposition to the civil service principles of merit employment. Few governmental units will be willing to place this power in the hands of the
3 In the private sector, an awareness of the "free' rider" problem has been met by
contractually imposing the obligation that each employee pay his fair share of the costs
of bargaining and contract administration. See NLRB v. GMC, 373 U.S. 734 (1963) (action
under the National Labor Relations Act); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367
U.S. 740 (1961), and Railway Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) (actions
under the Railway Labor Act). Where, in fact, there is exclusive recognition of a majority
union, the policy favoring the imposition of a fair financial burden on the nonmember
seems equally justified in public employment. There is as great a potential in public
employment as in private for acrimony between employees who support the union "that
gains substantial benefits for them and those [employees] who are . . . willing to accept
the benefits received but are not willing to pay the costs involved in obtaining them."
Grand Rapids Bd. of Educ. and Grand Rapids Educ. Ass'n (Fact-Finder's Report, Mich.
L.M.B.), in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE RE.. REP. No. 289: B-1, B-2 (March 24, 1969); accord,
Board of Educ., City of Inkster and Inkster Fed'n of Teachers, Local 1068 (Fact-Finder's
Report, Mich. L.M.B. Sept. 7, 1968), in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE RFL. REP. No. 263: F-l, F-2
(Sept. 23, 1968).
4 The militancy displayed by public employee unions often results from defending
themselves against organizational attacks by rival unions in the public service. See Oberer,
The Future of Collective Bargaining in Public Employment, 20 LAB. L.J. 777, 781 (1969).
A strike situation is as much a product of the union's lack of strength, inability to maintain effective control over the employees it represents, and need to develop a sense of
solidarity as it is a product of the union's assertion of economic strength after reaching
a substantive impasse at the bargaining table. See Gromfine, supra note 1, at E-1.
5 See note 2 supra.
6 The first proviso of § 8(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947
(29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964)) and § 2 Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 152
Eleventh (1964)) establish the illegality of the closed shop in the private sector.
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public employee union.7 Similarly, the union shop's requirement of
union membership is contrary to the individual's freedom of association as well as the guarantees implicit in the merit system, such as
equality of opportunity for appointment and promotion.8
The agency shop does not suffer from the same infirmities as the
dosed or union shop. Although this arrangement requires monetary
support of the majority representative, it protects the freedom not to
join the union. 9 Of course, tendering an amount sometimes equivalent
to union dues as a condition of continued employment is a strong
inducement to join the majority union, 0 but it is the employee who
decides whether or not to join. More importantly, the agency shop
arrangement, like the less desirable union and closed shop, promotes
the policy of stability within the bargaining unit and results in a more
responsible bargaining representative.
I
AGENCY SHOP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR-LEGAL

STATUS AND

CONFLICT

A. The Agency Shop as a Valid Objective under Existing State Law
Although the agency shop is receiving significant attention as a
subject for collective bargaining in the public sector, 1 the application
of the agency shop principle to public employment presents troubleH. KAPLAN, THE LAW OF Civn SRvicE 331 (1958).
8 See TASK FORCE REPORT § Ill(k) (1961), in I H. ROBERTS, LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE PuBLIC SERvxE 29 (1968), which recommended to the President a program
of labor relations within the federal service: "The Task Force wishes to state its emphatic
opinion that the union shop and the closed shop are contrary to the civil service concept
upon which Federal employment is based, and are completely inappropriate to the
Federal service."
9 See note 2 supra; Warczak v. Board of Educ., 73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1970).
1O Note, Municipal Employment Relations in Wisconsin: The Extension of Private
Labor Relations Devices into Municipal Employment, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 671, 683 n.47.
11 In 1968, 100 out of 500 contracts negotiated by the Michigan Education Association
contained agency shop clauses. Board of Educ., City of Inkster and Inkster Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 1068 (Fact-Finder's Report, Mich. L.M.B. Sept. 7, 1968), in BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYEE REr. REP. No. 263: F-1, F-2 (Sept. 23, 1968). The movement toward the agency
shop alternative seems to be growing among teacher unions and school boards. Waterford
Township Sch. Dist. and Waterford Educ. Ass'n (Fact-Finder's Report, Mich. L.M.B.), in
BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 275: B-2, B-3 to -4 (Dec. 16, 1968) (noting the
prevalence of agency shop contracts in 78 municipalities throughout Michigan). However,
the success of AFSCME, one of the largest public employee unions, in obtaining union
security in 43% of its approximately 700 collective bargaining agreements is perhaps
indicative of a trend toward other forms of union security. Of these, agency shop
provisions represent only 12% of the union's successes, while the union shop represents
37% and the modified union shop comprises 28%. See Gromfine, supra note 1, at E-9.
I See
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some legal questions. These problems arise in the context of the three
patterns of state laws against which the principle of th6 agency shop must
be analyzed. Some states have enacted no statutes concerning collective
bargaining between public employers and unions representing public
employees.12 A second category of states, which to some degree overlaps
the first, includes those with right-to-work legislation or constitutional
provisions.' 3 Finally, a number of states have provided a statutory
scheme for collective bargaining by public employees. 14 It is necessary
to explore the extent to which the agency shop is a permissible bargaining objective within the boundaries of each of these schemes. 15
1. States Without Public Sector Labor Legislation'16
Legislation governing collective bargaining in the private sector
rarely encompasses, and is often expressly inapplicable to, public employees.17 Similarly, courts have recognized the differences between
collective bargaining in the private and public sectors and have been
hesitant to raise the status of collective bargaining in public employment to that found in private employment.18 In some jurisdictions
without enabling legislation, no right of public employees to bargain
collectively is recognized. 19
12 See note 16 infra.

13 See note 31 infra.
14 See note 48 infra. The statutory authorization for collective bargaining may be
directed at public employees generally or at specific units of state employees, municipal
employees, public school personnel, or fire and police department personnel. Certain
statutes also encompass employees of publicly owned mass transportation and utility
systems, but these statutory schemes are not dealt with herein.
15 A basic characteristic of public employment-the civil service or merit systemtranscends an analysis of the agency shop under each of the three legal schemes. The
particular problems thus created shall be treated separately. See text at notes 128-75 infra.
16 Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Mississippi,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and West Virginia.
States with collective bargaining laws only for public employees in mass transportation or
in public utilities are classed as states without public sector labor legislation and include
Illinois (ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1112/, § 328a (Smith-Hurd 1966)), Louisiana (LA. RaV. STAT.
§ 23:890 (Supp. 1970)), and Ohio (OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 717.03 (Page 1954)). North
Carolina and Texas have no collective bargaining laws for the public sector, but they are
not uncommitted inasmuch as legislation prohibits collective bargaining in the public
sector (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-98 (1965)), or declares collective bargaining in public
employment to be against public policy (Tx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c (1962)); see
BNA Gov'r EMrPLOYEE REL. Rm. No. 335: B-4 (Feb. 9, 1970)).
17 E.g., 29 U.S.C. § 152 (1964); Tax. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c, § 1 (1962).
18 United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258 (1947) (Norris-LaGuardia Act not applicable
to public employees); Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946);
Mugford v. Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946); Weakley County Municipal Elec.
Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
19 E.g., Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168 P.2d 741 (1946); Mugford v.
Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946).
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Where the validity of collective bargaining agreements between
public employee unions and government units has been upheld absent
enabling legislation, 20 there is an avenue of argument available in
promoting the agency shop principle. An analogy can be drawn from
experience in the private sector. Common law principles supported the
validity of the closed shop2 l even before the National Labor Relations
Act (NLRA) formally provided for the closed shop in 1935.22 After that
date, and even subsequent to the 1947 amendment prohibiting the
closed shop,28 some states continued to uphold closed shop provisions
without supporting legislation and absent federal preemption in the
area. 2- Without some legislative mandate for collective bargaining a
court could in like manner balance union security in the public sector,
specifically the agency shop, against the interests of the state. If the
courts recognize the importance of union security within a framework
of collective bargaining in public employment, 25 the experience of the
private sector could provide sufficient precedent for validating an
agency shop provision as a common law right. 28
The notion that union security devices are inconsistent with civil
service legislation2 7 and the merit system 28 presents the major barrier
to acceptance of the agency shop as a bargainable item. Certainly, many
conditions of public employment (hours and grievances for example)
are within the discretion of administrative officials and could easily
20 E.g., Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951);
see Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1133 (1953 and Supp.). Executive decisions have provided the basis
for collective bargaining by public employees in the absence of specific enabling legislation. E.g., Op. ATr'y GEN. IDAHo, March 18, 1959 (absent local ordinances to the contrary, municipalities can "contract and be contracted with" by virtue of IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 50-301 (1967)); [1966] Op. ATr'y GEN. IND. 144, 158, Oct. 6, 1966. To the same effect is
an arbitrator's opinion in Toledo Ed. of Educ. v. Toledo Fed'n of Teachers Local 250,
BNA Gov'T EmpLOyr RE.L. REP. No. 325: B-8 (Dec. 1, 1969), that in the absence of
permissive legislation, the school board has the authority to negotiate teacher bargaining
agreements. But see IUOE v. Water Works Ed., 276 Ala. 462, 163 So. 2d 619 (1964);
Mugford v. Baltimore, 185 Md. 266, 44 A.2d 745 (1946); Weakley County Municipal Elec.
Sys. v. Vick, 43 Tenn. App. 524, 309 S.W.2d 792 (1957).
21 See 37 Micr. L. REv. 320 (1938); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 10, 18-21 (1935).
22 Ch. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (Wagner Act).
23 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964) (Taft-Hartley Act).
24 E.g., Park & Tilford Import Corp. v. Teamsters

Local 848, 27 Cal. 2d 599, 165 P.2d
891 (1946); Yeager v. Teamsters Local 313, 39 Wash. 2d 807, 239 P.2d 318 (1951).
25 See text at notes 1-10 supra. Underlying this analysis of the validity of the agency
shop absent public sector labor legislation is the assumption that public employees can
collectively bargain in the absence of statutory authority. See Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n v.
Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269, 276-77, 83 A2d 482, 485-86 (1951).
26 See Hopfl, supra note 2, at 483; cf. 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 393, at 940-41 (1953).
27 See Petrucci v. Hogan, 5 Misc. 2d 480, 486-90, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718, 726-29 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
28 See Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Bldg. Trades Council, 94 Cal. App. 2d 36, 'L5,
210 P.2d 305, 312 (1949).
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be made negotiable with a recognized employee representative without
usurping executive or legislative authority.29 The same may not be true
of rules and regulations for the discharge of employees, however, and
the agency shop is premised on some abdication of discretion in this
regard by the employer. Substantial difficulties arise, therefore, when
the agency shop is measured against the requirement that in permitting
public bargaining without enabling legislation there can be no irrevocable surrender to the bargaining agent of the power to make
governmental rules and regulations.3 0
2. "Right-to-Work" States
An additional complication involves the general right-to-work
provisions applicable in nineteen states, 3 nine of which are states having
no statutory scheme for collective bargaining in the public sector.3 2 The
belief that an employee should not be required to support an organization that he opposes3 3 has produced legislation at both the state3 4 and
national levels.35 The local-option clause, section 14(b) of the Labor29 See KALAN, supra note 7, at 339; Herrick, Unions for Government EmployeesTheir Implications, N.Y.U. 15TH- CONFERENCE ON LABOR 129, 134 (1962); Wollett, The
Public Employee at the Bargaining Table: Promise or Illusion?, 15 LAB. Lj. 8, 10 (1964).
But cf. Nutter v. Santa Monica, 74 Cal. App. 2d 292, 168, P.2d 741 (1946); Fellows v.
LaTronica, 151 Colo. 300, 377 P.2d 547 (1962); Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1289, 206
S.W.2d 539 (1947).
30

See W.

HART, CoLLEcfrva- BARGAINING IN THE FEDERAL Civit. SERvICE

passim (1961).

However, even in the absence of enabling legislation a number of public employers have
granted union security on occasion. Cf. K. HANSLowE, THE EMERGING LAw OF LABOR
RELATIONS IN PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT 54 (1967). But see Foltz v. Dayton, 73 L.R.R.M. 2548
(Ohio C.P. 1969) (ultra vires for municipality to contract for agency shop).
31 ALA. CODE tit.
26, §§ 375(1)-(7) (1958); Apaz. CONsT. art. 25; Aviz. RFv. STAT. ANN.
§3 23-1301 to -1307 (1956); ARK. CONsT. amend. 34; ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 81-201 to -205
(1960); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 6; GA. CoDE ANN. §§ 54-901 to -908 (1961); IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 736A.1-.8 (1950); KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 12; MIss. CONST. art. 7, § 198-A; Miss. CODE
ANN. § 6984.5 (Supp. 1968); NEB. CONST. art. 15, §§ 13, 14, 15; NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 48-217
to -219 (1968); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 613.130, 613.280-.300 (1967); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 95-78
to -84 (1965) (applicable to private employment); id. §§ 95-97 to -100 (applicable to
public employment); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-01-14 (1960); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 40-46 to -46.8
(1962); S.D. CONsr. art. 6, § 2; S.D. COMPILED LAws ANN. § 60-8-3 (1967); TENN. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-208 to -212 (1966); TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5207a (1962) (applicable to
private employment); id. art. 5154c, §§ 1-4, 6 (applicable to public employment); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 34-34-1 to -17 (Supp. 1969); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 40.68-.74.5 (Supp. 1969); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. §§ 27-245.1-.8 (1967). The right-to-work law in a twentieth state, Louisiana, applies
solely to agricultural workers. LA. Rav. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:881-889 (1964).
32 Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,
and Virginia.
Ba The problems inherent in the coercion of public employees to support the union
financially are treated in the text at notes 181-221 infra.
34 See note 31 supra; Higgins v. Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 28, 360 P.2d 456,
468, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 829 (1961) (reversing a trial court ruling that the agency shop
provision was not within the prohibitions of the Kansas right-to-work law).
35 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964).
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Management Relations Act (LMRA), expressly authorizes states to
outlaw agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as
a condition of employment.36 Upon this authority, twelve states continue to prohibit agreements that either establish union membership
as a condition of employment (union shop clauses) or require the payment of fees or charges from nonmembers (agency shop clauses), 7 The
seven remaining states38 have right-to-work statutes directed only at
union membership, but even in these states the validity of the agency
shop is judicially and administratively circumscribed.3 9
The applicability of state right-to-work provisions to the public
sector is a formidable obstacle to union security in public employment.
Only two states specifically except government employment from the
operation of right-to-work laws. 40 Most make some provision in their
constitutions, 4 ' statutes, 42 or administrative 43 and judicial 44 decisions
36 Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the execution or
application of agreements requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.
Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 14(b), 61 Stat. 151, 29
U.S.C. § 164(b) (1964) (emphasis added).
37 Alabama, Arkansas, Georgia, Iowa, Mississippi, Nebraska, North Carolina, South

Carolina, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and Wyoming. See statutes of these states cited in
note 31 supra. The legality of these prohibitions is clear, notwithstanding the use of the
term "membership" in the federal enabling legislation. Compare Retail Clerks v.
Schermerhorn, 375 US. 96, 98, 103 (1963), with NLRB v. GMC, 373 U.S. 734, 744 (1963).
38 Arizona, Florida, Kansas, Nevada, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas. See
note 31 supra.
39 See, e.g., Baldwin v. Arizona Flame Restaurant, 82 Ariz. 385, 313 P.2d 759 (1957);
Schermerhorn v. Local 1625, Retail Clerks, 141 So. 2d 269 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1962); Higgins v.
Cardinal Mfg. Co., 188 Kan. 11, 360 P.2d 456 (1961); Op. ATr'y GEN. NEv., No. 407,
Sept. 22, 1958, in 2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAws, NEv.
41025.05 (1966) (accord, Street
Elec. Ry. Employees, Div. 1225 v. Las Vegas-Tonopah-Reno Stage Line, Inc., 319 F.2d 783
(9th Cir. 1963)); [July 1, 1954-June 30, 1956] Op. ATr'Y GEN. N. DAK. 73, 74, Jan. 13, 1956;
[1967-68] Op. ATT'Y GEN. S. DAK. 221, July 8, 1958; Op. Arr'Y GEN. TEXAs, March 14, 1961,
in 2 CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAWs, TEX. 41205.10 (1966).
40 GA. CoDE ANN. § 54-901(a) (1957): "When used in this Chapter-(a) The term
'employer' ... shall not include.., any State, or any political subdivision thereof .... ";
Keeble v. City of Alcoa, 204 Tenn. 286, 319 S.W.2d 249 (1958) (holding the state right-towork statute not applicable to municipal employment; the statute did not mention
government as an employer, giving rise to a presumption against application to government units).
41 ARiz. CONST. art. 25: "[N]or shall the State or any subdivision thereof . . . enter
into any agreement .. . which excludes any person from employment or continuation of
employment because of non-membership in a labor organization;" accord, KAN. CoNsr. art.

15, § 12.
42 Nxv. REv. STAT. § 613.250 (1967); TEx. REv.
"[Njo person shall be denied public employment by
ship in a labor organization;" UTAH CoDE ANN. §
persons to work, whether in private employment or

Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5154c § 4 (1962):
reason of membership or nonmember34-34-2 (Supp. 1969): "[T]he right of
for the state, its counties, cities, school
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for a right-to-work in the public sector, commensurate with that applicable to private employment. Some right-to-work states, however,
have taken no position on the application of their statutes to the public
sector. 45 As unions of public employees strengthen their bargaining
status with governmental units in this last group of states, however,
movement towards application of the right-to-work principle to public
employment may, in fact, result. 46
Notwithstanding the five states that remain uncommitted,4 7 rightto-work legislation is a barrier to application of union security principles in public employment. Further discussion is directed, therefore,
only to the conceptual difficulties presented in applying union security,
and especially the agency shop, within the framework of the various
schemes for collective bargaining by public employees.
districts, or other political subdivisions, shall not be denied or abridged on account of
membership or nonmembership in any labor union ...
43 45 Op. Arr'y GEN. ALA. 93, Dec. 19, 1946, 92 Op. ATr'Y GEN. ALA. 38, Aug. 25, 1958
(concerning school districts), 87 O'. ATr'Y Gr. ALA. 35, June 1957 (concerning municipalities), 23 O'. ATr'Y GEN. ALA. 55, April 10, 1941 (concerning counties), and 45
Op,. A-r'Y G.N.ALA. 19, Dec. 3, 1946 (concerning the University of Alabama) review the lack
of authority of government subdivisions and agencies to contract with labor unions and
the state's power to prohibit making membership in a union a condition of continued
employment. See [1960] Op'. Arr'y GEN. IowA 168, Jan. 27, 1960 (concerning the right-towork of school teachers); [July 1, 1944-June 30, 1946] Op. ATr'Y GEN. N. DAR. 176, Dec. 17,
1945 (state agencies cannot be compelled to employ union members).
44 Potts v. Hay, 229 Ark. 830, 318 S.W.2d 826 (1958) (applying the general right-towork provision of ARK. CONs . amend. 34 to public employees); Classroom Teachers' Ass'n
v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 905 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1969) (public employees have the same rights
as are granted private employees by the right-to-work provision in the revised constitution
of 1968, with the exception of the right to strike); Levasseur v. Wheeldon, 79 S.D. 442, 112
N.W.2d 894 (1962) (applying the general right-to-work provision of S.D. CoNsT. art. 6, §
2 to public employees).
45 Mississippi, Nebraska, South Carolina, Virginia, and Wyoming.
46 A growing concern with the institutional development of public employee unions
in the third group of uncommitted states (note 45 supra) may be reflected in any of
several courses of action: (1) amending existing right-to-work laws to apply to public as
well as to private employees, see Classroom Teachers' Ass'n v. Ryan, 225 So. 2d 903, 905
(Fla. Sup. Ct. 1969) (Declaration of Human Rights of the Florida constitution art. 1, § 6
was amended in 1968 to reflect concern for the right-to-work of public and private employees); (2) enacting specific right-to-work legislation for the public sector, including (a)
a separate right-to-work statute (see note 42 supra) as embodied in a proposed "Federal
Employee Freedom of Choice Act" to establish a right-to-work for federal employees (see
BNA Gov'T EasrLoYvx REL. RE'. No. 244: A-13 (May 13, 1968)); or (b) a union security
prohibition written into legislation granting collective bargaining rights to public employees.
47 See states cited in note 45 supra.
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3. States With Labor Legislation for the Public Sector
A majority of states have special provisions governing collective
bargaining on behalf of various groups of government employees.48
48 States having collective bargaining laws for public employees:

Alabama:

Teachers and Munid] al
Employees
Firefighters

-ALA.

CODE tit. 55,

§ 317(3) (Supp.

1967).
-ALA.

CODE tit.

37, § 450(3) (Supp.

1967).
Alaska:

Public Employees

California:

Public Employees
Firefighters

STAT. §§ 23.40.010-.040
(1962).
-CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-11 (West
1966 and Supp. 1970).
-ALAsKA

-- CAL. LABOR CODE §§ 1960-63

(West Supp. 1970).
Enuc. CODE §§ 13080-88
(West 1969).
Public Employees of Los -Los Angles County Employee Relations Ordinance (Sept. 3, 1968)
Angeles County
Teachers

-CAL.

in BNA Gov'r EMPLOYEE REL.

Connecticut:

Municipal Employees
Teachers

Delaware:

Public Employees
Teachers

REP. No. 261: F-I to -7 (Sept. 9,
1968).
GEN. STAT. REv. §§ 7-467
-CONN.
to -478 (Supp. 1969).
-CONN. GEN. STAT. RFv. §§ 10-153
a-f (1967), as amended, (Supp.
1969).
-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1801-

12 (Supp. 1968).
-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, 99 400113, in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL.
REP. No. 322: F-1 to -3 (Nov. 10,
1969).
-FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 839.221 (1965).
-- Ch. 791, [1969] Fla. Laws, in 1
CCH LAB. L. REP.-STATE LAws,

Florida:

Public Employees
Firefighters

Georgia:

Public Employees of
Chatham County &
Savannah

-No. 967, [1968] Ga. Laws 2953
(declared unconstitutional in
Local 574, Internatl Ass'n of
Firefighters v. Floyd, 225 Ga. 625,
170 S.E.2d 394 (1969)).

Hawaii:

Public Employees

-HAwAii

FLA.

Maine:

State Employees
Municipal Employees

Maryland:

Teachers
Municipal Employees
of Baltimore

47,200 (1969).

REv. LAws §§ 76-101 to

102 (1968).
-ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 5,
§§ 751-53 (Supp. 1970).
-ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26,
§§ 961-71 (Supp. 1970).
-MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, §§ 160(a)(n) (1969).
-BALT.
CrTY CODE art. 1, §§ 11025, in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE
REL. REP. No. 266: E-1 to -8 (Oct.

14, 1968).
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However, only four of the relevant statutes4 9 expressly authorize the
execution of union security agreements by a public employer, even
Massachusetts:

Municipal Employees
State Employees

Michigan:

Public Employees

Minnesota:

Public Employees

-MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149,
§§ 178G-N (Supp. 1969).
-MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149,
§§ 178D-F (Supp. 1969).
-Mic.
STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1)(16) (1968).
-MINN.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 179.50-.58

(1966).

Teachers
Missouri:

Public Employees

Montana:

Nurses

Nebraska:

Teachers

STAT. ANN. §§ 125.19-.26
(Supp. 1970).
-Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530
-MINN.

(Supp. 1969).

Public Employees

Nevada:
New Hampshire:

Local Government
Employees
State Employees
Municipal Employees

New Jersey:

Public Employees

New York:

Public Employees

New York City

North Dakota:

Oregon:

Pennsylvania:

Rhode Island:

-MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. §§ 412201 to -2209 (Supp. 1969).
REv. STAT. §§ 79-1287 to
-NE.
-1295 (Supp. 1967).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 48-801 to -836
(1968), as amended, in BNA
GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No.
295: F-1 to -3 (May 5, 1969).
-Ch. 650, §§ 1-27 [1969] Nev. Stat.
1376.
-N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 98-C:l
to -C:7 (Supp. 1969).
-N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 81:3
(Supp. 1967).
-N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:13A1 to -11 (Supp. 1969).
-N.Y. Civ. SEEv. LAW §§ 200-12
(McKinney Supp. 1969).
-ADMIN.

CODE OF THE Crry OF

NEw YoRK ch. 54, §§ 1170 to
-73-13.0 (1967), in 2 CCH LAB. L.
47,450
REP.-STATE LAWS, N.Y.
(1968).
-N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 34-11-01 to
Public Employees
-05 '(1960).
-N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 15-38.1-01 to
Teachers
-15 (Supp. 1969).
-ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 243.710-.780
Public Employees
(1968), as amended, ch. 579 [1969]
Ore. Laws, in 4A BNA LAB. REL.
REP. 47: 2340 (1969).
-ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 342A50-.470
Teachers
(1968), as amended, ch. 647
[1969] Ore. Laws, in 4A BNA
LAB. REtL. REP. 47: 244 (1969).
Firefighters and Policemen-PA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10
(Supp. 1969).
-PA. STAT. tit. 43, §§ 215.1-.5 (1964).
Public Employees
-RJ. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1
Municipal Employees
to -19 (1956).
-R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 36-11-1
State Employees
to -6 (Supp. 1967).
-RI. GEN. LAWs ANN. §§ 28-9.1-1
Firefighters
to -14 (1956).
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with a union recognized as the exclusive representative of the employees
in an appropriate unit. Most legislation affording government employees
the right to join or associate with unions for the purpose of negotiating
collectively with public employers also protects the right to refrain
from forming, joining,50 or even assisting5 1 any public employee orTeachers

-R.I.

GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-1

to -16 (1956).
Policemen
South Dakota:

Public Employees

Vermont:

Municipal Employees

-R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.2-1
to -14 (1956).
--Ch. 88, §§ 1-8, [1969] S.D. Laws
154.
-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05
(Supp. 1969).

State Employees

-VT.

Teachers

(Supp. 1969).
-VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16,

STAT. ANN. tit. 3,

§§ 901-1007
§9

1981-

2010 (Supp. 1969).
Washington:

Public Employees

-WAsH. REv. CODE ANN.
§§ 41.56.010-.900 (Supp. 1969).

Teachers

-WASH.

REv. CODE ANN.

§§ 28.72.010-.090 (Supp. 1969).
Wisconsin:

Municipal Employees

-Ws. STAT. ANN. § 111.70 (Supp.
1969).
State Employees
-Wis. STAT. ANN.
111.80-.94
19
(Supp. 1969).
Wyoming:
Firefighters
-Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 27-265 to -273
(1967).
49 In Massachusetts a special statute directs the treasurers of the City of Boston and
Suffolk County to make payroll deductions from the salaries of employees and to pay such
deductions to the properly recognized or designated exclusive bargaining agent as an agency
service fee pursuant to an agreement to that effect. Ch. 335, [1969] Mass. Acts, in BNA
Gov'T EMpLOYEE RnL. REP. No. 800: B-i (June 9, 1969).
Municipal employees in Vermont have the same rights, with the exception of the
right to strike, as are enjoyed in private employment under the State Labor Relations
Act. Compare VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 1701-05 (Supp. 1969), with id. §§ 1501-05, 1541-44,
1581-85, 1621-23. Thus, municipal employees may join or refrain from joining unions
(id. § 1503), but may be subject to an express authorization of a union shop as a condition of employment (id. § 1621(b)); accord, R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-7-13.5, 36-11-6
(1967). Vermont also allows maintenance of membership provisions (VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3,
§ 962(3) (Supp. 1969)) and an agency shop variation (id. § 941(k)).
50 ALA. CODE tit. 55, § 450(3) (Supp. 1967) (firefighters); CAL. Enuc. CODE § 13082
(West 1969) (teachers); CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 3502 (West 1970) (public employees); CONN.
GEN. STAT. REv. § 10-153a (1967) (teachers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 839.221(2) (1965) (public
employees); HAWAu REv. LAws § 76.101 (1968) (public employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 26, §§ 963, 967(2) (Supp. 1970) (municipal employees); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149,
§ 178D (Supp. 1969) (state employees); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 125.21 (Supp. 1969) (teachers);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.52 (1966) (public employees); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.510 (Supp.
1969) (public employees); Ch. 650, § 9(1), [1969] Nev. Stat. 1376 (municipal employees);
N.Y. Crv. SEmv. LAW § 202 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (public employees); NJD. CENT. CODE
§§ 15-38.1-07(1), (2) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) (Supp. 1969)
(municipal employees).
51 BALT. CITY CODE art. 1, § 113, in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 266: E-1,
E-4 (Oct. 14, 1968) (municipal employees); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 98-C:2 (Supp. 1969)
(classified employees and non-academic university employees; the language of this statute
suggests that "assist" connotes merely serving as an officer or representative of the union
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ganization or union. 52 The statutes also prohibit employer or union

interference with, or discrimination because of, the exercise of these
rights. 53 This is similar to the scheme in the federal statute protecting
private employees.6
In assessing the possible validity of the agency shop under these
statutory schemes for public employment, it is instructive to note
the recent history of union security in the private sector. Section 7
of the NLRA guaranteed to employees "the right to self-organization,
to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection."'5 5 This is the same right to join protected
by a minority of state statutes in the public sector.56 Coupled with
this was the explicit provision in section 8(3) of the NLRA permitting
rather than payment of money); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public
employees); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 1982(a) (Supp. 1969) (teachers); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 111.82 (Supp. 1969) (state employees).
52 A minority of collective bargaining statutes for public employment protect the
right to join unions only. E.g., CAL. LAoR CODE § 1960 (West Supp. 1970) (firefighters);
CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 7-468(a) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 91,
§ 1802 (Supp. 1969) (public employees); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 963 (Supp. 1969)
(municipal employees); MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160(c) (1969) (teachers); MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 149, § 178H (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees); MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17A55(9)
(1968) (public employees); N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-11-01 (1960) (public employees); ORE. REv.
STAT. § 243.730 (1968) (public employees); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.040 (Supp. 1969)
(public employees).
A statute's failure to mention the right to refrain from joining unions of public employees may be significant if there is independent evidence of legislative acceptance of
union security. If a law authorizing deductions of dues from salaries of public employees
stipulates that such deduction is voluntary unless there is in effect an agreement between
the public employer and the exclusive bargaining representative making union membership a condition of continued employment, the deference shown the union shop in the
check-off statute is convincing evidence of a legislative intent not to protect the public
employee against union security under the collective bargaining statute.
53 E.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10) (1968): "It shall be unlawful for a public employer . . .(c) to discriminate in regard to hire, terms or other conditions of employment
in order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization ...." See also
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.84(l) (Supp. 1969) (interference or discrimination by state employer);
id. § 111.84(2) (interference or discrimination by public employee union).
54 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1), (3), 158(b)(1), (2) (1964). Of course, the federal law makes
a specific exception for the union shop, agency shop, and similar agreements. Id. § 158
(a)(3) (1st proviso).
55 National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452.
56 See Note 52 supra.
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the closed shop and other forms of union security. 7 In 1947 the LMRA
amended section 7 to guarantee the right of employees to refrain from
union membership and activities.58 Moreover, both the right to join
and the right to refrain from joining were protected from infringement
by the employer 59 and the union, 0 the same protection now accorded
to public employees under most collective bargaining laws.6 1 The
original closed shop proviso in section 8(3) was modified in LMRA
section 8(a)(3) to legalize only the union shop 62 and other less onerous
63
forms of union security.
Absent the closed shop proviso of section 8(3) in the NLRA, the
dictates of sections 7 and 8(3) would have made union security arrangements illegal.64 The LMRA's modification of the language in
the first proviso of NLRA section 8(3) outlaws the closed shop, but
it also indicates a congressional intention to allow employers and
unions that wish to eliminate the "free rider" the right to continue
to do so by less burdensome arrangements, notwithstanding the policy
of section 7 of the amended Act 6 5
Because most state statutes for public employment create no exception to the rights of membership and nonmembership in order to
accommodate union security arrangements, agency shop agreements in
the public sector appear to have been rejected. In other words, if the
language of a state statute authorizing collective bargaining by public
employees 6 embodies the language and principles of sections 7 and
57 Provided, That nothing in this Act ... shall preclude an employer from
making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of
employment membership therein, if such labor organization is the representative
of the employees . . . in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by
such agreement when made.
National Labor Relations Act of 1935, ch. 372, § 8(3), 49 Stat. 452.
58 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1964).
59 Id. §§ 158(a)(1), (3).
60 Id. §§ 158(b)(1), (2).
61 See notes 50-51 and accompanying text supra.
62 Provided, That nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United
States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization . . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on
or after the thirtieth day following the beginning, of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later ....
Labor-Management. Relations.Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act) § 8(a)(3), 61 Stat. 140-41,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964) (emphasis added).
63 See NLRB v. GMC, 373 U.S. 734, 739 & n.6 (1963).
64 Id. at 738-41; see 79 CONG. REc. 7570 (1937) (statement of Senator Wagner); id. at
7674 (statement of Senator Walsh).
65 S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 6, 7, in 1 LEG. HIST. LMRA 412, 413 (1947).
66 See notes 48, 50-52 supra.
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8(3) of the NLRA or sections 7 and 8(a)(3) of the LMRA, the
conspicuous absence of a union security proviso gives rise to the
negative implication that the state statute was intended neither to validate such a device nor to carve out an exception to the rights of public
employees created therein.
However, the history of legislation for the private sector is not
a conclusive guide to the interpretation of state statutes for the public
sector. Recent pronouncements by state courts and administrative tribunals point in the direction of permanent acceptance of the agency
shop, notwithstanding the absence of a "Wagner" or a "Taft-Hartley"
type proviso.
A demonstrative precedent can be found in Tremblay v. Berlin
Police Union,67 a declaratory judgment action decided by the Supreme
Court of New Hampshire. New Hampshire has no statute protecting
the right of public employees to union membership; instead the case
arose under a municipal ordinance authorizing recognition of unions
of municipal employees for the purpose of collective bargaining,68 as
permitted by the legislature. 69 Pursuant to the ordinance, the defendants,
Berlin police commissioners and the police union, agreed upon the
terms of a contract, including a so-called union shop clause.70 This
provision, together with the contract's "check-off" clause, imposed a
financial obligation on each police officer equal to that of union dues.
Although the contract "required" a police officer to be a union member,
the union could cause the discharge of an employee only for withdrawal
of the check-off authorization. 71 Thus the purported union shop ar7
rangement imposed no greater liability than an agency shop provision.2
The New Hampshire court held that the union security clause
was a reasonable concomitant of the state's declared public policy73 of
collective bargaining for public employees. The court pointed out
that no law in New Hampshire prohibited this form of union security;
moreover, a statute prohibited compelling any person to agree not
74
to join a labor organization as a condition of continued employment.
Since the latter statute related only to mandatory nonmembership,75
6r 108 N.H. 416, 287 A.2d 668 (1968).
68 Id. at 419, 287 A.2d at 670.
69 N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:8 (Supp. 1967). Tremblay held the collective bargaining ordinance of the city of Berlin valid under the New Hampshire statute.
70 108 N.H. at 422, 287 A.2d at 672.
71 Id.
72 See NLRB v. GMC, 873 US. 734 (1968).
73 See N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 31:3 (Supp. 1967).
74 N.H. Rav. STAT. ANN. § 275:1 (1966). Violation of the statute is punishable by
fine, imprisonment, or both. Id. § 275:2.
75 Id. § 275:1.
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mandatory membership as a condition of continued employment was
a permissible subject of collective bargaining and a permissible contract
provision so long as discharge of the municipal employees was only
for failure to meet the financial obligation. 6 This resulted in the
validity of a union security clause similar to the Taft-Hartley type of
77
union shop.
The Tremblay rationale is unfortunately broad. The court rested
its decision, in part, on the general legislation prohibiting only the
coercion of union nonmembership. It was unable to rely on a TaftHartley type of union security proviso as found in section 8(a)(3).
Litigation may therefore arise over the effects of such a union shop
provision upon a dissenting public employee who is-unlike the situation in Tremblay-a voluntary member of a rival union that did
not negotiate the contract. In this variation of Tremblay the court
could declare the union shop invalid since it may coerce the public
employee, paying dues to and actively participating in the minority
union, to forego his membership in that minority union. Had the
New Hampshire court in Tremblay limited its decision to the legality
of the provision for financial support of the union (the agency shop
element) rather than validating the requirement of union membership, the case would better support an interpretation of the enabling
legislation in favor of union security.
The obstacles inherent in the New Hampshire court's analysis of
of the dues-payment obligation are overcome in a line
legality
the
of cases construing Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act
(PERA).78 The agency shop was first accepted as a negotiable subject
in public employment in a decision of the Michigan Labor Mediation
Board, which held that a public employer violated the PERA by refusing to bargain with the American Federation of State, County and
Municipal Employees (AFSCME) on an agency shop contract for
sheriff's employees. 79 AFSCME had argued that union security provi76 108 N.H. at 422, 287 A.2d at 672. In support of its decision the court also noted
that in authorizing collective bargaining by public employees, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 31:8 (Supp. 1967) did not exclude police departments, as other statutes did. 108 N.H. at
422, 237 A.2d at 672.
77 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964) (1st proviso).
78 MicH. STAT. ANN. §§ 17.455(1)-(16) (1968). The PERA protects the right of employees of any political subdivision of the state "to organize together or to form, join
" Id. § 17.455(9). The PERA also prohibits a public
or assist in labor organizations ....
employer from discriminating "in regard to hire, terms or other conditions of employment in order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor oganization

Id. § 17.455(10)(c).
79 Oakland County Sheriff's Dep't v. Local 23, AFSCME, 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops.
1(a), BNA GovT EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: F-i (Jan. 15, 1968).
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sions were permissible subjects for collective bargaining and did not
violate section 10(c) 0 of the PERA as an encouragement of union
membership."" The Oakland County Sheriff and the Board of Supervisors, as respondents, contended that the conspicuous absence in section 10(c) of a union security proviso similar to that in the Taft-Hartley
Act evidenced a legislative intention to exclude all forms of union
security from the scope of collective bargaining in the public sector.
Respondents' argument rested not on the legislative history of the
PERA, which was unavailable, but on the experiences of the private
sector in applying sections 7 and 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 2 The
contentions were similar to those already reviewed,8 3 but were rejected
by a majority of the Board. 4
Chairman Howlett's opinion for the Board defined the discrimination prohibited by section 10(c) to include treatment affecting all
employees, 5 not merely as treatment distinguishing or "differentiating"
among employees."6 Since section 10(c) prohibits discrimination "in
'
order to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization" sv
and contains no Taft-Hartley-type proviso, the Chairman reasoned that
a closed or union shop is prohibited. He went on to say, however,
that an agency shop neither encourages nor discourages membership
in the union; rather, the provision is an encouragement merely to pay
the costs of bargaining.88 Howlett favored a policy of discouraging the
80 MicH.STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10)(c) (1968); see note 78 supra.
at 18, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-8.
81 1968 Mich. L.M.B.
82 Id. at 15-17, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE RE.L. REP. No. 227: at F-7 to -8.
83 See text at notes 55-66 supra.
84 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. at 33, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE RE.L. REP. No. 227: at F-14.
Member Weiss dissented on the union security issue, in part, because a traditional interpretation of the background and substance of the union security issue in private employment dictated a result similar to that suggested in the text at notes 55-66 supra.
1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. at 41, 47-49, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-18,
F-20 to -21.
85 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. at 34-35, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-15.
86 Member Walsh, concurring, had argued that only some maintenance-of-membership provisions violate § 10(c) by discouraging union membership, in that certain employees never have to pay an equivalent agency service fee. Id. at 38-89, 40, BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-16 to -17, citing Local 357, Teamsters v. NLRB, 365
U.S. 667, 689 (1961) (Clark, J., dissenting). It is now Board policy that maintenance-ofmembership clauses violate the PERA. See Saginaw v. Service Employees Int'l Union,
1969 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. 293, 296 n.1, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. RaP. No. 297: B-6,
B-7 n.1 (May 19, 1969). Maintenance-of-membership in public employment previously had
been discarded for purely policy reasons. See Waterford Township Sch. Dist. and Waterford Educ. Ass'n. (Fact-Finder's Report, Mich. L.M.B.), in BNA GOV'T EMPLOYEE REtL.
RP. No. 275: B-2 (Dec. 16, 1968).
87 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10)(c) (1968).
88 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. at 33, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-14;
see 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1238, 1246 (1968).
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free rider inasmuch as the union is the exclusive representative and
89
must fairly represent all the unit employees, including nonmembers.
He noted that the absence of union security may, in fact, discourage
union membership. 0 In answer to the respondents' analogy to the
Taft-Hartley Act, Howlett concluded that the legislature, in prohibiting
discrimination with regard to membership only, did not desire to
imitate the relevant Taft-Hartley sections in their entirety. 91
This view is supported by the decisions of several Michigan
circuit courts which, unlike the Board in the Oakland case, considered
the PERA provisions as both protecting the right to join unions92 and
prohibiting discrimination to encourage or discourage union membership.9 3 In City of Warren v. Local 1383, Firefighters,4 the city sought
a declaratory judgment interpreting an agency shop clause in its contract.9 5 The court upheld the agency shop provision in an opinion
that recognized that the clause required only payment and not membership as a condition of continued employment. It also indicated that
the legislature in section 10 did not intend to invalidate union security
agreements that are nondiscriminatory and made pursuant to the
legislative authorization for collective bargaining in public employment.9 6
Relying on the language of City of Warren, the Circuit Court for
97
Wayne County in Smigel v. Southgate Community School District
upheld an agency shop clause negotiated by the school district and a
teachers' union, the exclusive representative. The court held that the
clause, similar to the one in City of Warren, did not require union
membership and did not cause discrimination in violation of section
10(c) of the PERA.9 8 Further noting that the agency shop "has become
an acceptable method of creating stability in public employee-employer
relationships," 99 the court concluded that the agency shop is a valid
subject for collective bargaining in the public sector. 100
89 1968 Mich. L.MJ3. Ops. at 32 & n.36, BNA Gov'T EMPLoYEE REL. REP. No. 227:
at F-14 & n.36, citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
00 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops. at 33, BNA Gov'r EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-14.
91 Id. at 32, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYE REL. REP. No. 227: at F-14.
92 MIcH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(9) (1968).
93

Id. §17.455(10)(c).

94 68 L.R.R.M. 2977 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
95 The provision is reproduced in 68 L.R.R.M. at 2977.
96 68 L.R.R.M. at 2978.
97 70 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
98 Id. at 2044.
99 Id. at 2043.
100 Id. The court denied plaintiffs' motion for an order to show cause why an injunction should not issue restraining the school district from discharging them for their
failure to pay the agency fee. Id. at 2045.
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Although only one Michigan appellate court has considered a case
involving the validity of the agency shop as a subject for collective
bargaining by public employees, 10 1 the foregoing decisions make an
affirmative answer probable in future appeals. 10 2 Recent decisions not
only condemn the free rider, but also recognize the necessity for the
financial security of the public employee union as an independent
basis for agency shop validity. 103
This does not mean that the Michigan courts will automatically
uphold an agency shop provision similar to that in City of Warren;
at least one court has recognized a necessary limitation on the operation
of an agency shop. The Circuit Court for Wayne County in Nagy v.
Detroit"4 circumscribed the duty to pay an agency service fee within
a duty of "fair contribution."' 1 5 The court refused to enforce an agency
fee that did not reflect a pro rata share of the actual cost of collective
bargaining. The fee could not properly include any additional costs to
the union that were unrelated to the services rendered the nonmember
and arose from activities in which the nonmember plays no part and
has no voice.10 8
Michigan's recognition of the agency shop 10 7 as a permissible sub101 See Pullen v. County of Wayne, No. 8201 (Mich. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 1969), discussed in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 327: B-1 (Dec. 15, 1969) (refusing to disturb a Wayne County Circuit Court decision, which upheld the validity of agency shop
provisions in contracts covering public employees because an abuse of discretion by
the trial court was not demonstrated).
102 The decision in City of Warren was not appealed (see Brief for Defendant Local
1061, AFSCME at 13, Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1969)), but an appeal in Smigel has been filed with the Michigan Court of Appeals
(letter from Erwin B. Ellman, Esq., to the author, Oct. 21, 1969, on file with the Cornell
Law Review). An appeal of the most recent Michigan case is also contemplated. See Warczak v. Board of Educ., 73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1970), discussed in BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYE REL. REP'. No. 383: B-2, B-3 (Jan. 26, 1970).
103 The court in Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969) commented:
A bargaining agent without financial security would indeed be weak and ineffective. It requires financial security to give it the stature, aggressiveness and confidence as a responsible and capable representative institution and to enable it
to adequately protect and promote the best interests of the employees it represents, both union and non-union. What is more, a strong capable bargaining
agent is necessary to achieve a better relationship between labor and management and to guard against labor disorders which too often arise to endanger
the country's economy and which should be avoided.
Id. at 2364; see Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2260 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1969).
104 71 L.R.R.M. 2362 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
105 Id. at 2364.
106 Id.
107 See note 53 supra. The reasoning employed by the Michigan board and courts
suggests that the union shop and its variations are illegal subjects for bargaining in any
state that prohibits encouragement or discouragement of union membership, whether
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ject of collective bargaining is significant because PERA section 10(c)
is representative of provisions in a majority of state statutes concerning
the public employee's freedom from discrimination with regard to
membership in a union. The Michigan precedents clearly emphasize
the desirability of the agency shop or variations of it.18 They provide
a rationale for sustaining union security arrangements that the decision of the New Hampshire Supreme Court in Tremblay fails to
provide. The policy analysis of Tremblay is sound, but Tremblay's
reasoning should not be accepted in any state that prohibits the encouragement or discouragement of union membership. The Michigan
analysis of the agency shop appears equally applicable under a "rightto-join" statute (as in Michigan) or under the majority of statutes
containing the double-edged sword of organizational rights-the right
to join or refrain from joining. 0 9 Because the agency shop does not
require membership,"1 0 there is no direct interference with a public
employee's right to refrain from joining a union."'
the state merely protects the right to join a public employee union, as do Michigan and
a minority of states (see note 52 supra), or also protects the correlative right to refrain
from joining (see notes 50-51 supra).
108 Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257 (Mih. Cir. Ct. 1969),
concerned a "modified" agency shop which required nonmembers to contribute the
equivalent of dues to an educational fund servicing the children of all municipal employees, rather than to the union. This agreement was held not to violate the PERA's
anti-discrimination provision (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(10)(c) (1968)) because: (1) § 10(c)
was designed to prevent employer discrimination and not to preclude bargained-for contract provisions; (2) the scholarship contribution prevented discrimination against union
members (i.e., the "free rider" argument); and (3) the modified agency shop had no
more tendency than the traditional agency shop to encourage or discourage membership. 72 L.R.R.M. at 2259-61. The court commented that the rationale of this modified
agency shop was not the principle of unjust enrichment which underlies the traditional
agency shop; rather, the provision was intended to make free riders "hurt" as much as
union members. Id. at 2260. This view is contrary to the one taken by the plaintiff, that the
ultimate objective of the union was security within the collective bargaining framework,
although the city was unwilling to grant the traditional agency shop. Brief for Plaintiff
at 16-17, Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
Although the union did not accomplish one of its objectives, namely, remuneration
for its efforts at representing all employees, the union's modified agency shop would
seem to accomplish a second objective-inducing the employee to become a union member. 72 L.R.R.M. at 2259. Given the choice of joining the union and receiving the benefits
therefrom or of remaining a nonmember obligated to pay the equivalent of union dues
to a scholarship fund unrelated to the nonmember's conditions of employment, a nonmember may decide to channel the compulsory wage deduction to the union by opting
for union membership. Thus, the Grand Rapids case is authority for permitting an
agency shop even if it ha the result of encouraging union membership.
109 See notes 50-52 and accompanying text supra.
110 But cf. text at note 10 supra.
111 But cf. the experience in New York State. In New York the Taylor Act (N.Y.

Civ. Sav. LAw §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1969)) protects the right to join and the
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However, the legality of an agency shop under a statute providing
for the double-edged sword of organizational rights may depend, to
some degree, upon the judicial balancing of protections to be afforded
a majority union, a minority union, and the employees. In Wisconsin,
for example, a collective bargaining law protects the right of municipal
employees to join or refrain from joining unions112 and, like Michigan,
prohibits discrimination that encourages or discourages such union
membership or nonmembership." 3 Although there was an attempt
to write an agency shop proviso into the law, 1 4 the attempt was unsuccessful and the Wisconsin statute is silent on union security." 5 In
that context a recent decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court appears
to foreclose consideration of meaningful union security. In Board of
School Directors v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission,"1 6
the court was faced with a challenge to a check-off agreement negotiated
right to refrain from joining a union of public employees (id. § 202) and prohibits discrimination encouraging or discouraging union membership (id. §§ 209-a.l (a) to -.2(a)). Although the legality of an agency shop is unclear (see Note, Exclusivity, Necessity of
Elections, and "Union" Security Agreements under New York's Public Employees' Fair
Employment Act, 32 ALBANY L. REv. 138, 151-54 (1967)), existing administrative precedent
is unfavorable to the agency shop. Counsel to the Public Employment Relations Board
(PERB), the agency administering the Taylor Act, has construed the right to join or
refrain from joining as precluding at least two forms of compulsory union membershipthe closed shop (Op. PERB COUNSEL
1-509 (Dec. 11, 1967)) and the union shop (OP.
PERB COUNSEL
1-519 (Feb. 9, 1968)). A fact-finder for PERB recommended that a
union security clause that in part provided for an agency shop was of "doubtful legality," as were those forms of union security resulting in union membership. See City of
Auburn, N.Y. and District Council 30, AFSCME (PERB June 6, 1968), in BNA GOv'T
EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 250: B-2 (June 24, 1968). See also Ritto v. Fink, 58 Misc. 2d 1032,
297 N.Y.S.2d 407 (City Ct. 1968).
A test of the legality of the agency shop may be forthcoming in New York City,
governed under the Taylor Act by the local New York City Collective Bargaining Law.
ADMiN. CODE OF THE CrrY or NEw Yom ch. 54, §§ 1173-1.0 to -13.0 (Supp. 1969), in 2
CCH LAB. L. REIP.-STATE LAws, N.Y.
47,450 (1968). In the summer of 1969 the United
Federation of Teachers and the City Board of Education entered into a three-year agreement providing for what may be termed a "most-favored-union clause"--the UFT is
guaranteed an agency shop if any other municipal union is granted the privilege in
future negotiations with the City of New York. See BNA Gov'r EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No.
303: B-6, B-8 (June 30, 1969). The New York Legislature is considering a proposal to permit negotiation of agency shop agreements. See BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 337:
B-16 (Feb. 23, 1970).
112 Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.70(2) (Supp. 1969).
113 Id. § 111.70(3)(a).
114 See BNA Gov'T EmPLoYEE REL. REP. No. 122: B-4 (Jan. 10, 1966), reporting
Governor Knowles's veto of a bill authorizing the agency shop as a valid subject of collective bargaining between any political subdivision of the state and an employee organization. See generally Notes, Municipal Employment Relations in Wisconsin, 1965
Wis. L. REv. 652 & 671.
115 See Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 111.70(l)-(5) (Supp. 1969).
116 42 Wis. 2d 637, 168 N.W.2d 92 (1969).
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by the majority union representative of the teachers and the local
school board." 7 A minority union asserted that the municipal employer
could not grant the privilege of check-off exclusively to the majority
union, and the court agreed." 8
Relying on the dictates of subsections 2 and 3(a) of the Wisconsin
statute, the court adopted a test to determine what subjects of collective bargaining in the public sector result in the prohibited practice
of encouraging or discouraging union membership:
Those rights or benefits which are granted exclusively to the

majority representative,and thus denied to minority organizations,
must in some rational manner be related to the functions of the
majority organization in its representative capacity, and must not

be granted to entrench such organization as the bargaining representative.11 9

Applying this standard, the court held that the check-off agreement, a
minimum form of union security, 120 was a prohibited practice under
the state statute. 121 The court further condemned the exclusive check-off
as "self-perpetuation and entrenchment" 122 contrary to the policy expressed in the Wisconsin law.
Viewing this decision prospectively, it appears likely that the Supreme Court of Wisconsin will extend Board of School Directors to
include the agency shop as unlawful discrimination under subsection
3(a) of the statute. By its very nature, the agency shop is a form of
union security, having as one of its goals the self-perpetuation and
entrenchment of the union. 12 3 Moreover, the Wisconsin approach may
be attractive to courts in jurisdictions with similar statutes124 that have
not as yet recognized the policy considerations controlling the positions
in Michigan 25 or New Hampshire. 126 The Wisconsin precedent serves,
11

A check-off provision is also a form of union security involving a deduction by

the employer of, most typically, the union dues from an employee's wages. The amounts
so deducted are paid over to the union. LABOR LAw TRUSt GRouP, supra note 2, at 635.
118 42 Wis. 2d at 648-50, 168 N.W.2d at 97-98.
119 Id. at 649, 168 N.W.2d at 97 (emphasis by the court).
120 Id. at 649 n.4, 168 N.W.2d at 97 n.4.
121 Id. at 650, 168 N.W.2d at 98.
122 Id. at 649, 168 N.W.2d at 98. Contra, Bauch v. New York, 54 Misc. 2d 343, 282
N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct.), afj'd, 28 App. Div. 2d 1209, 285 N.Y.S:2d 263 (1st Dep't 1967), aff'd,
21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 NXE.2d 211, 289 N.YS.2d 951, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968); Kugler
v. New York, 73 L.R.R.M. 2478 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
123 The Wisconsin Supreme Court cites the exclusive check-off, which it condemns,
as not nearly so effective as a "union security" agreement, but as falling in the same
category of provisi6ns. 42 Wis. 2d at 649, 168 N.W.2d at 97.
124 See notes 50, 52-53 and accompanying text supra.
125 See notes 92-111 and accompanying text supra.
126 See text at notes 67-77 supra.
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by analogy, as highly persuasive authority in opposition to efforts towards union security and its concomitant, a greater guarantee of stable
27
labor relations in public employment.
The legality of the agency shop remains a controversial issue for
those states that authorize collective bargaining rights for public employees. To the extent that the determination of the issue depends upon
an interpretation of the guaranteed rights to join or not to join and
the prohibitions of coercion in the exercise of these rights, it appears
that the threshold question concerns the relevant public policy, absent
substantial legislative history or statutory direction regarding union
security. On the other hand, a legal basis for the agency shop appears
foreclosed where there is a right-to-work guarantee or where there is
legislative silence in the sphere of public employment. Separate problems
arising from the civil service laws and rules by which public employment is uniquely governed add to this dilemma.
B. Erosion of the Traditional Operations of the Civil Service by the
Agency Shop
The merit system, as embodied in state and local civil service
laws, seeks to protect the public employee from political and arbitrary
infringement upon employment rights, including the conditions under
which an employee may be discharged or disciplined.128 Friction has
resulted in the operation of civil service systems when collective bargaining has been allowed to include subjects traditionally within the
exclusive operations of a merit system but not essentially related to
the principle of merit employment. 1 29 The notion that union security,
with its accompanying sanction of discharge, is incompatible with
civil service concepts of merit employment has become a popular theme
among commentators. 13 0
127 Special problems for the agency shop may arise where the statute also protects
the right to refrain from assisting the union, as does another Wisconsin statute. Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 111.82 (Supp. 1969) (state employees); see note 51 and accompanying text
supra.
128 See Rubenstein, The Merit System and Collective Bargaining in Delaware, 20
LAB. L.J. 161 (1969).
129 E.g., discharge pursuant to an agency shop arrangement.
180 Mr. Vosloo in his study of collective bargaining by federal employees concluded:
Compulsory membership in a union as a prerequisite for . . . continuation
in the public service would be as incompatible with the merit principle as discrimination based on political affiliation, religious belief, race or creed. It therefore appears that the "open shop" is the only type of union arrangement that
may assume a proper place in the civil service.
W. VosLoo, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING IN THE UNITED STATES FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE 32
(1966). See Hart, supra note 30, at 190-91. See also Kaplan, supra note 7, at 331; S. SPERo,
GOVERNMENT As EMPLOYER 378 (1948). But see HANSLOWE, supra note 30, at 115; Anderson, Labor Relations in the Public Service, 1961 Wis. L. REV. 601, 618.
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In the absence of state legislation authorizing collective bargaining
in the public sector, courts were willing to defer to the dominant interests of the merit system in early attempts by public employee unions
to achieve union security. For instance, in Petrucciv. Hogan,131 a court
granted an injunction against picketing to promote union security.
In that case employees of the city-acquired transit system, on being
classified in the civil service, resigned from the union. In light of the
constitutional and statutory civil service provisions, the court held
that picketing at the employees' homes to coerce them into resuming
membership was illegal:
The right to appointment depends upon merit and fitness, not
upon membership in a labor organization. Inasmuch as plaintiffs
have acquired civil service status, they may be removed only for
causes recognized by law . . . and not for their failure to resume

union membership. 132
Recognition of the necessity for collective bargaining in the public
sector requires a reevaluation of the traditional operation of civil
service and merit employment, especially with regard to accommodating
the latter to the principle of union security. With the enactment of the
various collective bargaining laws for the public sector 13 many states
have provided a framework within which the conflict between operation of the civil service system and collective bargaining can be resolved.1n3
1. State Statutes Affording Predominance to the Civil Service
Scheme
There are certain patterns and attitudes expressed in statutes deferring to the civil service or merit system. For instance, the California
Government Code 3 5 and similar state statutes 36 maintain the pre5 Misc. 2d 480, 27 N.Y.S.2d 718 (Sup. Ct. 1941).
Id. at 487, 27 N.Y.S.2d at 725; cf. Hagerman v. City of Dayton, 147 Ohio St. 313,
71 N .E2d 246 (1947) (check-off in support of a maintenance-of-membership provision
in a unit of public employees was an unlawful union security arrangement in violation
of the standards for discharge inherent in the civil service system).
133 See note 48 supra.
134 All statutes providing for some accommodation of the principles of merit employment and collective bargaining contain statements similar to that in New York's
Taylor Act regarding the right to union representation: "Public employees shall have the
right to be represented by employee organizations to negotiate collectively with their'
public employers in the determination of their terms and conditions of employment,
and the administration of grievances arising thereunder." N.Y. CrV. SERv. LAW § 203
(McKinney Supp. 1969).
135 Nothing contained herein shall be deemed to supersede the provisions of
existing state law and the charters, ordinances and rules of local public agencies
which establish and regulate a merit or civil service system or which provide
for other methods of administering employer-employee relations.
CAL. Gov'T CODE § 3500 (West 1966) (public employees).
136 E.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 77, § 160k (1969) (teachers): "Nothing contained herein
131
132
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dominance of the merit system over any right to bargain collectively
over subjects which affect, in particular, the tenure of public employees. 137 A second group of collective bargaining laws maintains
"due regard" for certain practices of merit employment. 138 A third
type of statute defers to certain exclusive management rights including
the right to discharge "for cause."' 18 9
The latter two categories of statutes provide few guidelines for
shall be deemed to supersede other provisions of this Code and the rules and regulations
of public school employees which may establish and regulate tenure."
MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 149, § 178N (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees, with the
exception of Boston where the agency shop is specifically authorized): "Nothing in
sections one hundred and seventy-eight F to one hundred and seventy-eight M, inclusive,
shall diminish the authority and power of the civil service commission .... "
Ch. 650, § 10(2), [1969] Nev. Laws 1377 (municipal employees): "Each local government is entitled, without negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from
negotiation . . . (b) To hire, promote, classify, transfer, assign, retain, suspend, demote,
discharge or take disciplinary action against any employee .... "
N.J. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 34:13A-5.3 (Supp. 1969) (public employees): "Nothing herein
shall be construed to deny to any individual employee his rights under Civil Service
laws or regulations."
RI. GEN. LAws ANN. § 36-11-5 (Supp. 1969) (state employees): "Whenever the procedures under a merit system statute or rule are exclusive with respect to matters otherwise comprehended by this chapter, they shall apply and shall be followed."
WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 41.56.100 (Supp. 1969) (public employees):
[N]othing contained herein shall require any public employer to bargain collectively with any bargaining representative concerning any matter which by
ordinance, resolution or charter of said public employer has been delegated to
any civil service commission or personnel board similar in scope, structure and
authority to the board created by chapter 41.06 RCW.
137 See HANSLOWE, supra note 30, at 60.
138 For example, article 1, § 10 of the BALTIMoRE CrrY CODE, in 4 BNA LAB. REL.
REP. 30:223 (1968), provides:
Municipal agencies and employees and their representatives shall have a
mutual obligation to endeavor in good faith to resolve grievances and differences relating to terms and conditions of employment with due regard for and
subject to the provisions of applicable laws relating to personnel policies, including hiring, promotion, suspension, discharge, position classification and fixing
of compensation and any and all other laws, ordinances and Charter provisions
governing public employment and fiscal practices in the City of Baltimore.
A variation of this scheme is found in Minnesota:
Governmental agencies and public employees and their representatives shall have
a mutual obligation to endeavor in good faith to resolve grievances and differences relating to terms and conditions of employment, acting within the framework of laws and charter provisions, and giving consideration to personnel
policies, position classification and compensation plans, and other special rules
governing public employment.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 179.50 (1967).
139 For example, the Wisconsin collective bargaining statute for state employees
provides that nothing in the law may be construed to interfere with the right of a
public employer to "discharge for just cause" under the applicable law, rule, and regulation. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.90 (Supp. 1969); see Note, supra note 10, at 685-86.
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determining the scope of the preemption by the civil service scheme of
the collective bargaining rights of public employees. Rather than removing the substantive subject of union security from the purview of
collective bargaining, perhaps all that was intended by such statutes
was the creation of a procedural safeguard whereby the operation of
an agency shop would be subject to the remedial or appellate procedures of a civil service system regarding a tenure matter. 140 Moreover,
if a public employer enters an agency shop relationship with the exclusive representative of its employees in an attempt to stabilize labor
relations in the public sector, the employer, in effect, declares "good
cause" for discharge to be the failure to support the union.1 41 Thus
the civil service requirement seems satisfied.
2. State Statutes Affording Predominance to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement
A clear expression of legislative intent to accommodate the system
of merit employment with collective bargaining is found in the collective bargaining legislation announcing the dominance of the labor
contract. The Delaware law is the best example of this trend. 142 Originally the statute provided that procedures under the merit system
were exclusive with regard to matters covered by the collective bargaining provision for public employees. 143 This provision was repealed
in 1968, and the law now provides that nothing contained in the
statute governing the merit system of personnel administration for
state employees shall deny, limit, or infringe upon the right of the
collective bargaining agent to engage in collective bargaining. 144 More
specific language is found in statutes of other states. 145
140 See Brief for Plaintiff at 22, Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M.
2257 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969).
141 See Smigel v. Southgate Community Sch. Dist., 70 L.R.R.M. 2042, 2044 (Mich.
Cir. Ct. 1968).
142 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1301-12 (Supp. 1969).
143 Ch. 126, § 1312, [1965] Del. Laws 438 (repealed 1968).
144 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1312 (Supp. 1969).
145 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-474(f) (Supp. 1969) (municipal employees):
Where there is a conflict between any agreement reached by a municipal
employer and an employee organization and approved in accordance with the
provisions of sections 7-467 to 7-477, inclusive, on matters appropriate to collective bargaining, as defined in said sections, and any charter, special act, ordinance,
rules or regulations adopted by the municipal employer or its agents such as
a personnel board or civil service commission, or any general statute directly
regulating the hours of work of policemen or firemen, or any general statute
providing for the method of covering or removing employees from coverage
under the Connecticut municipal employees retirement system, the terms of
such agreement shall prevail.

The Connecticut law in § 7-474(g) specifically excludes from the scope of collective bar-
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Inclusion of a public bargaining statute in the codified civil
service law also evidences the dominance of the subsequent labor
relations provisions over the traditional operation of a merit system,
absent any provision to the contrary. 146 Where in some instances a statute
further provides that " 'matters within the scope of collective bargaining' shall mean matters designated to be within the scope of collective
bargaining by executive order,'

47

the municipal executive can easily

limit the operation of the municipal civil service scheme by designating
48
the agency shop to be within the scope of collective bargaining.
3. Judicial Determination of Civil Service Predominance
The majority of public bargaining statutes take no position on
the relation between collective bargaining rights and the merit principle of employment, thus leaving this issue for judicial determination.
It has been suggested that the unique nature of public employment,
to which civil service statutes and ordinances are, in part, directed,
149
precludes agency shop provisions in collective bargaining agreements.
gaining certain operations of a municipal civil service system, including the conduct and
grading of merit examinations, rating and listing of candidates for appointment, and regulating political activity.
The Maine law permits discipline and discharge of a public employee contrary to
the traditional principles of merit employment, so long as the disciplinary procedures
are subject to terminal arbitration:
If a collective bargaining agreement between a public employer and a bargaining agent contains provisions for binding arbitration of grievances involving
the following matters: The demotion, lay-off, reinstatment [sic], suspension, removal, discharge, or discipline of any public employee, such provisions shall be
controlling in the event they are in conflict with any authority and power, involving such matters, of any such municipal civil service commission or personnel
board or its agents.
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 969 (Supp. 1970).
As to appointments and promotions, however, the civil service procedures are controlling. Id.
146 E.g., N.Y. Crv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-12 (McKinney Supp. 1969) (public employees).
147 ADMiN. CODE OF =hE CiTY OF NEW YORK ch. 54, § 1173-3.0(m) (Supp. 1969), in
47,450.08 (1968) (New York City Collective Bar2 CCH LA. L. REP.-STATE .LAws, N.Y.
gaining Law).
148 The collective bargaining statute for Vermont teachers gives the same effect to
school board decisions: "All decisions of the school board regarding matters in dispute in negotiations shall, after full compliance with this chapter, be final." VT. STAT.
16, § 2008 (Supp. 1969). Of lesser effect is the Michigan statute for state emANN. tit.
ployees:
The provisions of this act as to state employees within the jurisdiction of
the civil service commission shall be deemed to apply insofar as the power
exists in the legislature to control employment by the state or the emoluments
thereof.
Micir. STAT. ANN. § 17.455(4)(a) (1968).
149 See Oakland County Sheriff's Dep't v. Local 23, AFSCME, 1968 Mich. L.M.B. Ops.
1(a), 16, BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 227: F-I, F-7 (Jan. 15, 1968).
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However, the circuit courts of Michigan, the predominant forum for
the litigation of this issue to date, have found little merit in this assertion.
Clampitt v. Board of Education,1 ° for instance, raised the issue of
conflict between an agency shop clause negotiated by a teachers' union
and the teachers' tenure law, which, like the more general civil service
laws, restricts the bases for discharge. The court maintained that the
purpose of the teachers' tenure act was to promote "an adequate and
competent teaching staff, free from political and personal arbitrary
interference."'151 It noted that it was not inconsistent with the tenure
act for the school board to contract for an agency shop or to enforce
an agency shop agreement through the discharge penalty; the union
security clause in no way placed "continued employment of the teacher
152
on the mercy and whim of changing office holders."'
The civil service principle of merit employment, including the
concept of discharge for cause, also came under direct attack when the
City of Warren sought a declaratory judgment of the validity of the
agency shop clause negotiated with the firefighters' union.'5 3 In the
City of Warren case the court noted that the broader issue involved
the conflict between the PERA and the Civil Service Act.1 4 The court
preferred the provisions of the PERA, as special legislation, over
those of the Civil Service Act, a general statute. Thus an agency shop
provision of a contract entered into pursuant to the PERA was effective, notwithstanding contrary provisions of the Civil Service Act.155
The court reasoned that the city was not acting contrary to the Civil
Service Act by enforcing a requested discharge of an employee refusing
to pay the agency fee pursuant to a valid agency shop clause. 50 Because
of the operation of the agency shop agreement, the court suspended
the provisions of the Civil Service Act specifying discharge only for
57
neglect of duty and incompetency.
Michigan cases subsequent to City of Warren have not only attempted to resolve the conflict between collective bargaining and merit
15o 68 L.R.R.M 2996 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968). The case was ultimately dismissed because plaintiff had not exhausted remedies that were available under the contract and

under the tenure statute.
151 Id. at 2997 (dictum).
Id. at 2999 (dictum).
153 City of Warren v. Local 1383, Firefighters, 68 L.R.R.M. 2977 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
152

1968).
154 Id.
T15 Id. at 2978.
156 Id.; see discussion in text at notes 78-111 supra of the legality of the agency
shop under the PERA in Michigan.
157 68 L.R.R.M. at 2977.
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employment, but have also tried to suggest the complementary nature
of the two statutory schemes as they relate to union security. In
Smigel v. Southgate Community School District,6 5 the court was faced
with alleged violations of the procedural and substantive safeguards of
the teachers' tenure law. 159 In assessing the penalty of discharge for
failure to tender the agency fees, the court found no conflict with the
tenure law's requirement of "reasonable and just cause" for discharge. 160
Because the union security arrangement fell within the limits of permissible collective bargaining under the PERA, 161 the determination
of the school district that noncompliance with the agency shop provision constituted reasonable and just cause for discharge was controlling.621 In effect, by making reference to the purposes of both statutes, as the Clampitt court had done previously, 163 the court in Smigel
concluded that there was "a common unified goal precluding an interpretation of the tenure act urging a conflict with P.E.R.A."'I6
The agreement between the union and the school district in
Smigel made dismissal for noncompliance with the agency shop clause
subject to the procedures of the Michigan tenure act,' 65 thus assuring
review of a teacher's suspension pending his discharge at the end of
the semester. 166 Review by a tenure or civil service commission, however,
is restricted to a determination that there was nothing arbitrary or
capricious about the discharge and that such dismissal was motivated
solely by the refusal of the employee to pay a reasonable agency fee
168 70 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968).
159 Article IV, § 1, of the tenure act (MicH. STAT. ANN. § 15.2001 (1968)) provides:
"Discharge or demotion of a teaher on continuing tenure may be made only for reasonable and just cause, and only after such charges, notice, hearing, and determination
thereof, as are hereinafter provided."
160 70 L.R.R.M. at 2044-45.
161 Id. at 2043-44.
162 Id. at 2044. The second section of article 2 of the agreement between the Southgate school board and the union recognized that the "refusal of ... [a] teacher to
contribute fairly to the costs of negotiation and administration of this and subsequent
agreements is . . . just and reasonable cause for termination of employment." Id. at 2043.
163 See discussion in text at notes 150-52 supra.
164 70 L.R.R.M. at 2044; accord, Swartz Creek Bd. of Educ. and Swartz Creek Teachers Ass'n (Fact-Finder's Report, Mich. L.M.B.), in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No.
267: B-3 (Oct. 21, 1968).
165 70 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
166 The court in Clampitt dismissed an action by a teacher to enjoin enforcement of
of the agency shop agreement because the teacher had not exhausted procedures for
reviewing a discharge. 68 L.R.R.M. at 2999. However, the Smigel court took the case
notwithstanding the failure of the complaining teacher to use the tenure act's appellate
procedures because "[t]o subject a teacher to discharge and the subsequent cumbersome
procedures seeking to test the foregoing conclusions would constitute an unreasonable
burden." 70 L.R.R.M. at 2045.

1970]

AGENCY SHOP IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

to the union. A civil service commission cannot disagree with what a
municipal employer defines as "cause" under a valid agency shop
provision. To hold that the commission has this legal capacity would
abrogate the municipal employer's authority to establish working conditions within the framework of collective bargaining formulated by
the PERA; 167 moreover, it would bring the civil service commission in
conflict with the agency created to enforce the collective bargaining
statute for public employees.
Since both the collective bargaining law and the civil service statute
pertain to conditions of public employment, the possibility of conflict
between the public employer and the civil service commission looms
large. 168 There is a danger that the debate concerning the legality and
desirability of the agency shop in public employment will become subordinated to a conflict over who, the commission or the public employer,
has authority to negotiate and administer contracts. Failure to resolve
the conflict might result in restrictive legislation benefiting neither the
union and its members nor the governmental employer. 169
One way to avoid the possibility of conflict is to recognize the civil
service commission as a necessary and proper party to all collective bargaining sessions and contract disputes involving issues, such as the
agency shop, that establish conditions of employment independent of
those originally contemplated by the civil service regulations. 70 Also,
the existing civil service machinery might be used to administer some
public employment programs.' 7 ' The authority of a civil service com107 Grand Rapids v. Local 1061, AFSCME, 72 L.R.R.M. 2257, 2262 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1969).
168 See BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE EL. REP. No. 282: B-9 (Feb. 3, 1969), wherein it is
reported:
The [Detroit] Civil Service Commission fears that union-management contracts negotiated under PERA may strip it of regulatory and policy-making functions, leaving it only with the job of administering rules and procedures drafted
by other parties, much as the company personnel office in private industry ...
It fears that permitting elected officials to negotiate personnel practices threatens
to subject public employment to the sort of political manipulation whose [sic]
abuses led to creation of the merit system years ago.
169 For example, chapter 12, § 3640, of a proposed amendment to the California
statute governing labor relations in the public sector would restrict negotiable subjects
to matters expressly delegated by the legislature and not within the authority of the
state personnel board or covered under the civil service law. BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL.
REP. No. 285: E-l, E-3 (Feb. 24, 1969).
170 See Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362, 2366-69 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969). Under
present schemes for collective bargaining by public employees, however, most civil service commissions do not participate in negotiation or administration of collective bargaining agreements. This was the most significant finding in a survey by the California
Personnel Board of federal, state, and local civil service agencies. BNA Gov'T EMPLOYE
R.L. RE'. No. 303: D-1 (June 30, 1969).
171 See HANsLowE, supra note 30, at 52.
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mission to so participate in collective bargaining and contract administration will remain uncertain until the commission's power to review
a discharge pursuant to an agency shop agreement is finally determined.17 2 Such an accommodation appears possible, however, even
though provisions of civil service statutes that are inconsistent with
special collective bargaining laws for public employees may, by implication, be repealed or at least suspended upon adoption of a valid agency
shop arrangement. 173 The inconsistencies need not operate as a suspension or repeal of all parts of the civil service statutes that deal with
some aspect of the bargaining relationship. 174
Except in those jurisdictions where statutes specifically exclude the
discharge of public employees governed by civil service law from the
range of negotiable subjects, 1 75 the agency shop may be accommodated
with the civil service scheme of merit employment. To better illustrate
how the agency shop may be a permissible objective in the public sector,
a proposal will be made to aid in evaluating the line of developments
heretofore reviewed.
II
RESOLVED:

A

MODEL AGENCY SHOP STATUTE

Public employees should enjoy rights comparable to those guaranteed their counterparts in private employment. Insofar as states have
recognized the organizational and collective bargaining needs of public
employees, 176 they should also be willing to adopt the concept of union
security. Without a secure union the stability of the bargaining unit
is impaired, and the exclusive agent cannot adequately represent the
interests of its constituency.
172 On February 26, 1970, the Michigan Tenure Commission upheld a discharge for

failure to pay an agency service fee. The teacher involved announced plans to appeal. See
Applegate v. Grand Banc Community Sch., discussed in BNA Gov'T EmPLoYEE REL. REP.
No. 339: B-8 to -9 (March 9, 1970).
173 See City of Warren v. Local 1383, Firefighters, 68 L.R.R.M. 2977 (Mich. Cir. Ct.
1968).

174 See Civil Service Comm'n v. District Council 77, AFSCME, No. 124936 (Mich. Cir.
Ct. 1969), noted in BNA GOV'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 295: 3-2, B-3 (May 5, 1969).
Where the state constitution authorizes a governmental subdivision to maintain a tenure
or merit system for its employees (e.g., MIcH. CONsT. art. XI, § 6; CALn. CONsT. art. XXIV,
§ 1) or the local charter or ordinance designates a civil service agency to exercise power
over appointments, contracts of employment, promotions, and discharges (see 62 C.J.S.
Municipal Corporations §§ 704-05 (1949)), a complete suspension of the civil service
scheme is not intended.
175 See notes 135-36 supra.
176 See note 48 supra.
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Of course, the unique nature of government as employer gives rise
to conflicting considerations, and it is therefore necessary to accommodate the union security principle with both the statutory scheme for
labor relations in the public sector and the civil service scheme of merit
employment. As in the private sector, consideration must also be given.
to the individual rights of the public employees working under union
security provisions.1 77 What is needed is a comprehensive framework
within which the public employer and the exclusive representative of
a unit of public employees may negotiate an agency shop agreement.
To this end, a statute in support of the agency shop concept is suggested.
The statute offers a model for those jurisdictions in need of enabling
legislation as well as a model of the terms and conditions to be considered in drafting a union security agreement between the public
employer and the bargaining agent.
For the purpose of the model statute, certain terms are defined:
(1) Public employer refers to the governmental subdivisions to
which the agency shop statute is made applicable, such as the state
or any agency of the state, or any other political subdivision of or
within the state, or any agency thereof;
(2) Union refers solely to the organization that has been designated
or selected by a majority of the public employees in an appropriate
unit as the exclusive representative of all employees in such unit
for purposes of collective bargaining pursuant to law;
(3) Appropriate unit refers to a unit of public employees at any
plant or installation or in a craft or in an operational department
of a public employer which establishes a clear and identifiable
community of interest among the public employees concerned;
(4) Objecting employee refers to an employee of the public employer in the appropriate unit who refuses to tender to the union
an agency service fee pursuant to an agency shop agreement as authorized by the model statute.
As the comments following the text of the model statute reveal,
the language reflects, for the most part, the experiences under the
Taft-Hartley and Railway Labor Acts as well as the experiences with
the recent attempts at union security in the public sector.
A. A Model Agency Shop Statute
Section 1. Purpose.-This Act shall validate the agency shop as a
permissible subject of collective bargaining between a public employer
and the union representing an appropriate unit of its public employees
if such agency shop provision meets the standards as hereinafter described.
177 See Oberer, supra

note 4, at 782.
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Section 2. Provisions and Conditions of an Agency Shop Agreement.-Nothing in any other law of this state or any political subdivision of or within the state shall preclude a public employer from
executing an agreement with the union to require as a condition of
continued employment the payment by all employees to the union of
any agency service fee, subject to the following provisions:
(1) Amount of Payment.-The agency service fee shall be a sum
proportionately commensurate with the costs of collective bargaining
and contract administration; provided however,
first, such sum representing an agency service fee shall not reflect
the additional costs of other expenses or activities that have no relation
to the collective bargaining and contract administrating services rendered by the union to the public employees;
second, such sum representing an agency service fee shall not reflect
the costs of financial support of political causes, except to the extent
that it is necessary for the union to engage in political activity in order
to foster the goals of the union in collective bargaining and contract
administration or to secure for the employees it represents advances in
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment which ordinarily
cannot be secured through bargaining collectively with the public
employer. Nothing in this section shall authorize inclusion in the
agency service fee of any sum representing expenditures or contributions to a political party, to a candidate for a political or elected office,
or to a current officeholder.
(2) Time of Payment.-Payment of the agency service fee shall be
made to the union, during the term of the collective bargaining agreement so providing, on or after, but in no case sooner than:
a. the thirtieth day following the beginning of employment or
the date of satisfactory completion of the appropriate probationary
period, whichever is later, for new employees appointed to positions
in the collective bargaining unit from employment or promotional lists;
b. the tenth day following the beginning of employment for employees entering into work in the bargaining unit from re-employment
lists;
c. the date of satisfactory completion of the probationary period
or the completion of a three-month period following the beginning of
employment, whichever is sooner, for employees hired on a temporary
basis;
provided however, no employee in the aforementioned categories
nor any employee in the employ of the public employer at the time an
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agency shop agreement becomes effective shall be required to tender
the agency service fee before the thirtieth day following the date the
said agreement becomes effective.
(3) Methods of Payment.-Payment of the agency service fee shall
be made by the public employee so affected either directly to the union
or its agent at reasonable intervals or by executing a check-off authorizadon empowering the public employer to deduct the agency service fee
from the salary or wages of the employee at reasonable intervals and
to forward such sums so collected to the union or its agent, according
to an agreement so providing; provided however, a check-off authorization, once executed by an employee and delivered to the public employer pursuant to an agreement, shall remain in effect for a twelvemonth period from the date of delivery to the public employer or until
the agency shop agreement has been terminated, whichever condition
occurs first.
(4) Nonpayment, Default.a. In the event that the agency service fee is not tendered by the
employee in compliance with sections 2(2) and 2(3) of this Act, according to an agreement so providing, the public employee shall be considered in default of his duty to pay such sum.
b. The procedure following default shall be as follows:
(i) Notification of the existence of the default shall be made by
the union to both the public employer and the defaulting employee.
Immediately upon receipt of the notification of default, the public
employer shall notify the defaulting employee of the decision to terminate his employment.
(ii) After the occurrence of a default, the services of the defaulting
employee shall be discontinued only upon completion of the employment period peculiar to the work performed by such defaulting employee, but in no event shall such employee be discharged before the
thirtieth day following personal notification of the termination of
employment.
(iii) The defaulting employee shall have the right to contest the
decision to discontinue his services before the tenure, merit, civil service, or personnel commission generally responsible for the appointments, promotions, discipline, and discharges of public employees in his
work classification, or before the board generally responsible for the
administration of any statute or ordinance authorizing organizations of
public employees to collectively bargain with public employers; provided however, first, election of the commission or board shall preclude
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the jurisdiction of any other forum in the matter; second, nothing shall
preclude an appeal to a court of competent jurisdiction from the final
determination of such commission or board.
(iv) If, at the end of the employment period or the thirtieth day
following the personal notification of termination of employment, as
referred to in paragraph (ii) above, the defaulting employee shall be
pursuing any legal remedies contesting the termination under section 2
(4), such defaulting employee's services shall not be terminated until
such time as the defaulting employee shall have either obtained a final
determination of the validity or legality of such termination, or said
employee has ceased to pursue the legal remedies available by not making a timely appeal of any decision rendered in the matter by the
commission, board, or court of competent jurisdiction.
(v) As a condition to contesting the decision to terminate employment upon default as provided above, the defaulting employee shall
authorize his public employer prior to the end of the employment or
thirty-day period, as referred to in paragraph (ii) above, to deduct from
his wages funds equivalent to the agency service fee at appropriate
intervals, which funds shall be paid into an escrow account administered
by the commission, board, or court pending final determination of the
defaulting employee's claim, as provided in paragraph (iv) above. The
authorization to deduct the funds to be held in escrow shall include
authorization to deduct back fees due, but such deduction shall be
reasonably proportioned so as not to unnecessarily burden the defaulting employee.
(vi) At the election of the defaulting employee, procedures under
section 2(4)(b) shall be terminated, the decision to terminate employment under section 2(4)(b)(i) shall be rescinded, and the defaulting
employee no longer shall be considered in default under section 2(4)(a);
provided the defaulting employee first, pays to the union the agency
service fees due from the time of default, second, executes a written
statement of intention to comply with section 2(3), and third, pays any
reasonable sum representing the cost to the union or employer resulting
from the default.
(5) No agency shop agreement executed pursuant to this Act:
a. shall take effect until a civil service commission or public
employment relations board or similarly constituted agency, as stipulated by the union and employer, shall have certified that at least a
majority of the public employees to be affected by the agency shop
agreement have indicated their support for the agency shop agreement
as negotiated;
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b. shall authorize any relationship or obligation to the union on
the part of an objecting employee other than that authorized by the
Act;
c. shall take, or remain in, effect if membership in the union was
not available to all employees subject to the payment of the agency
service fee on the same terms applicable to members of the union generally.
B. Comments on the Model Act
1. Section 1-The Right to Bargain for an Agency Shop
Section 1 of the model statute establishes the legality of bargaining over and contracting for an agency shop provision. By enabling such
collective bargaining, this part of the model statute denies the applicability of right-to-work laws to the public sector'7 8 and resolves the conflicts arising from the ambiguous guarantees and prohibitions of many
of the collective bargaining laws directed at public employment. 7 9
However, the model statute does not intend to label the agency
shop as a mandatory subject of collective bargaining, as it is in private
employment. 80 Because the model statute should be most acceptable
in states having statutory schemes for collective bargaining, to present
the agency shop as a mandatory subject might conflict unnecessarily
with a contrary determination under the relevant language of the general collective bargaining statute. Thus, the model statute merely removes the shadow of illegality from an agreement that embodies the
principle of an agency shop and permits bargaining over the provision.
2. Section 2(1)-Protection of the Employee's Rights from the
Coercive Nature of the Agency Shop Provision
The provisions of section 2(1) and its two provisos generally reflect
recognition of the freedom of association and expression guaranteed to
an objecting employee by a series of Supreme Court cases.' 8' In one
of the cases, Railway Employes' Department v. Hanson,'8 2 the Court
held, in part, that the union shop authorization of the Railway Labor
Act 8 8 did not unconstitutionally deprive a worker of his property with178 See text at notes 31-47 supra.
170 See text at notes 48-53 supra.
180 See NLR.B v. GMC, 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
181 Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employes' Dep't v.
Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
182 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
183 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh (1964).
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out due process of law or infringe upon his freedom of association by
requiring union membership and payment of dues, initiation fees,
and assessments pursuant to an agreement between a union and an
employer so providing.
Setting aside the issue of union membership, an authorization of
the agency shop for public employees presents issues similar to those
raised in Hanson. It may be argued that the justification for requiring
all employees to share the costs of union activity on their behalf is
somewhat reduced in the public sphere where government, as employer,
has demonstrated a greater willingness to protect the interests of its
workers. 8 4 But in upholding the legality of agreements made pursuant
to the union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act the Supreme
Court found the union shop to be a permissible means of achieving
"[i]ndustrial peace along the arteries of commerce."' 1 5 In this same
manner a state government's interest in using the agency shop to
stabilize labor relations and encourage union responsibility outweighs
the threat of possible restrictions of the objecting employee's first and
fourteenth amendment rights, 186 especially when those constitutional
rights receive adequate protection under the agency shop agreement.
The public employee needs protection from the obligation to pay
an unreasonable agency service fee. Union fees and dues reflect a variety
of expenditures, many of which are unrelated to the services an objecting employee receives from the public employee union as bargaining
agent. A troublesome problem in public employment concerns the
propriety of using compulsory payments representing an agency service
fee for purposes not germane to collective bargaining. 8 7 Section 2(1)
and its first proviso require only the payment of an employee's pro rata
share of the costs of bargaining and administering the contract. 8 Certainly, internal union provision for other expenditures, such as scholarship and emergency relief funds, remains the obligation of only the
member. 8 9
The extent to which an agency service fee can reflect an assessment
for the costs of external political activity engaged in by the union poses
184 See Note, Labor Relations in the Public Sector, 75 HARv. L. REv. 391, 403 (1961).
185 351 U.S. at 233.
186 See id. at 233-38.
187 See id. at 235 & n.7.

188 This is wholly consistent with the Supreme Court's interpretation of union
security under the Railway Labor Act in Hanson. Id. at 235.
189 See Hopfl, supra note 2, at 480; The Supreme court, 1960 Term, 75 HLv.L,
REv. 40, 236 (1961).
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a more complex issue. 190 In the private sector the contractual obligation
requiring contribution to the costs of collective bargaining by all employees may not lawfully include support of political activities of the
union over the objection of an individual member. 191 But unlike the
situation in the private sector, political activity by a public employee
union is intricately connected to the union's program of advancing
conditions of employment in the public sphere. 19 2 This is particularly
true where the right to strike is denied the public employee and his
union; to a considerable degree the public employee union must rely
on political pressure rather than economic sanctions to achieve its
goals. 19 3 It is because of the particular public nature of the process that
a public employee union must look to the state or local legislatures for
the realization of that part of its program not achieved through traditional collective bargaining. For this reason, the concept of political
190 Concern with the use of compulsory-dues money for political purposes prompted
a Detroit teachers' group to challenge the agency shop provision in the present contract
between the Detroit Federation of Teachers and the school board. A Michigan trial
court dismissed the suit holding that the teachers' rights guaranteed by the first, third,
fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution and
Article I of the Michigan Constitution were not violated. Warczak v. Board of Educ.,
73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1970). Plans to appeal this case, the first to raise the
issue of agency fees used for political purposes, have been announced. BNA Gov'T EmPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 333: B-3 (Jan. 26, 1970).
191 Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740,(1961). In the Street case a group of railroad employees
sued to enjoin enforcement of a union shop agreement, alleging that a substantial part of
the money they were compelled to pay was used, over their protests, to finance the
campaigns of political candidates whom they opposed and to promote the propagation
of political doctrines with which they disagreed. The Supreme Court held, in part, that
section 2, Eleventh, of the Railway Labor Act, in authorizing union shop agreements,
denied unions the power, over an employee's objection, to use his exacted funds to
support political causes which he opposes. 367 U.S. at 765-70.
In Allen, which arose under facts similar to Street, the Court held that a union using
sums exacted under a union shop agreement to finance political activities, over an
employee's objection, must refund to him "a portion of the exacted funds in the same
proportion that union political expenditures bear to total union expenditures, and [must
reduce such future] . . . exactions from him by the same proportion." 373 U.S. at 122-24.
Both cases arose under the Railway Labor Act, which permits negotiation of a
union shop agreement. Insofar as the Taft-Hartley Act encompasses a similar public
policy, the Street and Allen restrictions are applicable to all private employees covered
thereunder.
192 For example, public employee unions expend much time and money in appearing before legislative committees, drafting legislation, and lobbying for their programs
of labor relations in public employment. See Note, supra note 184, at 403; BNA Gov'T
EMPLOYEE REL. RPp. No. 338: D-l, D-4 (March 3, 1970).
193 See Note, supra note 10, at 691.
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activity of public employee unions is distinguishable from that of their
private sector counterparts. 9 4
This distinction exists solely with regard to the union's activities
concerned directly with advancing the employment conditions of its
constituents. The second proviso to section 2(1) of the model statute
recognizes this by permitting only the costs of political activity closely
connected with the employees' economic employment interests to be
included in the agency service fee.195
One observer, however, foresees the possibility for abuse in carving
out a public employment exception to the strict Street and A len rules 95
of the private sector:
Thus there arises the possibility of involuntary contributions to
organizational support of politicians who, while ready to improve
the working conditions of public employees, on other questions
take positions of which such public employees disapprove. Unless
careful protections are worked out, enabling individual public
employees to "contract out" from compelled support of unwanted
political parties, politicians, and public policies, the union [or
agency] shop in public employment has the potential of becoming
a neat mutual back-scratching mechanism, whereby public employee representatives and politicians each reinforce the other's
interests and domain, with the individual public employee and the
individual citizen left to look on, while his employment conditions, and his tax rate, and public policies generally are being
decided by entrenched and mutually supportive government officials and collective bargaining
representatives over whom the
197
public has diminishing control.
The second proviso to section 2(1) of the model statute recognizes the
possibility of this "back-scratching" abuse and seeks to protect the
employees and the public by precluding assessment in the agency service
194 See Note, supra note 184, at 403-04. But cf. the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice
Frankfurter in the Street case, 367 US. at 812-15.
195 See Hopfl, supra note 2, at 480; accord, Nagy v. Detroit, 71 L.R.R.M. 2362, 2364-65
(Mich. Cir. Ct. 1969) (validating an agency fee payment representing a fair contribution
to the costs of bargaining and contract administration to the union).
The accounting involved, while somewhat burdensome, is not an impossible task.
Accounting techniques have been used to allocate the numerous cost factors in the
operations of manufacturing concerns. The union as a business presents no more
formidable a problem. HopfS, supra note 2, at 480. Contra, The Supreme Court, supra
note 189, at 238. One solution to the fee apportionment problem is suggested by the
Swiss experience where nonmembers pay only the approximate costs of collective bargaining. Dudra, The Swiss System of Union Security, 10 LAB. L.J. 165 (1959).
196 See note 191 supra.
197 HANsLowE, supra note 30, at 115.
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fee for contributions or expenditures made on behalf of political parties, candidates, or current office holders. 198
3. Section 2(2)-The Agency Shop Grace Period
Section 2(2) provides a grace period within which certain categories
of public employees may either begin to tender an agency service fee
as provided by contract or leave the employ of a particular public
employer. Provisions of this kind are supported by the policy of authorizing a grace period for private employment, embodied in the first
proviso to section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.199
Under the model statute, the period of time within which a public
employee must make the individual choice to remain in a unit subject
to an agency service fee depends upon his employment status. Subsections (a), (b), and (c) of section 2(2) attempt to take account of probable
status classifications inherent in a system of employment and promotion
which, up to the time of an agency shop contract, have been governed
solely by civil service or merit regulations. The purpose of section 2(2),
then, is to accommodate the civil service practice with the grace
200
period.
For a permanent employee who was not a union member when
the contract was executed the grace period incorporated in the proviso
to section 2(2) is the same as that in the Taft-Hartley proviso for section
8(a)(3)-thirty days. In the other subsections of section 2(2) it is recognized that by the nature of certain public employment (e.g., teaching
and fire fighting) a probationary period longer than thirty days may be
required. During such probationary period an employee may be subject
to summary discharge or discharge for less than cause. The model
statute recognizes the point at which the public employee achieves some
degree of permanence in employment as the effective date for the
initiation of the agency fee requirement.
198 Section 2(l) of the model statute in no way addresses itself to the application of

the Street and Allen precedents to the financial obligation of a member of a public
employee union where an agency shop provision is in force.
199 Although the legislative history of the 20-day grace period in the LMRA is
scant, reference is made to it in H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1947); 93
CONG. REc. 8615 (1947) (remarks of Representative Brehm); 93 CONG. Rmc. A2011 (1947)
(remarks of Representative Meade). The purpose of the grace period was merely to give
the new employee enough time to decide if he wished to remain at his job subject to a
union security provision.
200 Cf. BNA Gov'T EMPLOY
REL. REP. No. 313: B-3 (Sept. 8, 1969), reporting a
union security agreement negotiated in August 1969 for hospital employees of the state
of Rhode Island incorporating a scheme for initial payment based upon employment
status.
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Thus, the intent of section 2(2) is to stabilize the representational
ability of the union through financial contributions as soon as the
employment status of a particular employee becomes reasonably secure.
The time provisions as they apply to (a) new employees in the unit,
(b) re-employed employees, or (c) temporary employees are general and
should be adjusted for the problems of the particular unit represented.
For instance, the statutory probationary period for teachers is usually
three years before tenure can be granted. 20 1 To permit a newly hired
teacher to be free from an agency shop obligation for that length of
time would undermine the purpose of the model statute. Therefore,
the statutory basis of a "probationary period" should not be considered
to coincide with the granting of tenure. A more equitable period should
be adopted by the parties; in the case of teachers the grace period should
perhaps approximate that period of time covered by the first scholastic
term from the time of hiring. The language of the model statute's
section 2(2)(a), providing for an "appropriate probationary period,"
should be considered as permitting the parties to the agreement to vary
the strict probationary period of a tenure or civil service statute or
regulation where it is necessary.
4. Section 2(3)--Direct Payment or Check-Off of the Agency Shop
Fee-The Individual's Choice
Once it has been decided that the agency shop is in the best interests of the public employment relationship, expedient methods for payment of the service fee should be set forth. Section 2(3) of the model
statute permits the public employer and the union to bargain for an
arrangement whereby its employees are permitted to assign out of
their wages an amount representing the negotiated agency service fee,
which is then paid over to the union at regular intervals. Such a check-off
has become commonplace in private industry20 2 and in the labor policies
20 3
of governmental bodies.
201 See M. MOSKOW,

TEACHERS AND

UNIONS

77 (1966); E. SHiLs & C. WUTrrE,

TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND COLLECtivE BARGAINING 493 (1968).

202 For example, the Railway Labor Act, in 45 U.S.C. § 152 Eleventh(b) (1964), specifically empowers the carrier and the exclusive bargaining agent to agree on an exclusive
dues check-off.
203 The practice is authorized in the federal civil service. See Exec. Order 11491, § 21,
34 Fed. Reg. 17607 (1969); REPORT OF THE PaRsmENT's REvIEw COMM. ON EMPLOYEE-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL SER vIcE, in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 280: 10
Special Supp. (Jan. 20, 1969). State laws also promote use of the check-off in public labor
relations. See, e.g., N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 208 (McKinney Supp. 1969). Questions concerning the constitutionality of provisions for exclusive check-off in public employment are
dealt with in Bauch v. New York, 54 Misc. 2d 343, 282 N.Y.S.2d 816 (Sup. Ct), affd, 28
App. Div. 2d 1209, 285 N.YS.2d 263 (Ist Dep't 1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 599, 237 N.E.2d 211,
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While the check-off is an efficient method of implementing a policy
of stable labor relations in public employment, the right of individual
choice in the mechanics of fulfilling the agency shop requirement
should be maintained to the greatest extent possible. Thus, section 2(3)
permits the check-off only as an alternative to direct payment to the
union.
Section 2(3) contemplates voluntary, written authorization of the
check-off by the employee or the exercise of an option at his discretion
to make payments directly to the union. Thus the alternate provisions
for payment of the agency service fee should in no way conflict with an
express state policy prohibiting involuntary wage deductions. 20 4 But in
order to guarantee a measure of certainty in the method of financial
support of the union during the term of a contract embodying the
union security agreement, provision is made in the proviso to section
2(3) obligating an employeee for a year once he has voluntarily authorized the check-off.
5. Section 2(4)-ProceduralFairnessfor the Objecting Employee
Section 2(4) provides certain safeguards protecting the employment status of an objecting and defaulting public employee. At the
same time this section contemplates an efficient means for the union
to police the obligation to pay the agency service fee. The paragraphs
of section 2(4)(b) attempt to reconcile potential conflicts in the adminisof a civil service system and an agency shop arrangement. 20 5
tration
Paragraph (ii) and succeeding paragraphs establish
a period beduring
of
employment
tween the default and the ultimate termination
which a defaulting employee can attempt to avert the possibility of
discharge. The purpose of these paragraphs is to accommodate the
principle of employment based upon merit with the totally unrelated
concept, novel to the public sector, of discharge for failure to pay a
fee. For the most part, the time limit of paragraph.(ii) reflects conditions
peculiar to certain classes of public employees. It is not in the public
interest, for example, to dismiss a teacher who defaults in February before the end of the school year. Conversely, the sanitation worker is
basically unskilled and can, in most cases, be easily replaced; he should
be provided with employment beyond his default only insofar as is
289 N.Y.S.2d 951, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 834 (1968); cf. Kugler v. New York, 73 L.R.R.M.
2478 (Sup. Ct. 1970).
204 See, e.g., MicH. STAT. ANN. § 28.585 (1954), prohibiting involuntary wage deduc-

tions and punishing violations as misdemeanors under the Penal Code.
205 See text at notes 128-75 supra.
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necessary to effectuate his resort to the remedial procedures outlined
in the other paragraphs of section 2(4)(b).
The language of paragraphs (iii) and (iv) conforms to the approach
of the parties in the Smigel case,200 in which an agency shop agreement
made discharge for failure to tender the agency fee subject to the dismissal procedure of the Michigan tenure act for teachers. Paragraph
(iii) permits, in addition, an election between the processes of a civil
service commission and those of a public employment relations board
which oversees the administration of a public bargaining statute, if one
exists. The latter extension is provided because the agency shop provision is a product of the bargaining relationship; the public employment
relations board is a superior forum because of its expertise in resolving
issues raised by defaulting employees contesting an agency shop dismissal. Deference to a civil service commission is made in paragraph (iii)
merely because of its traditional role in reviewing the discharge of
public employees, but such deference operates only upon the express
election of the defaulting employee.
Section 2(4)(b)(iv) secures continuity of employment beyond the
period specified in section 2(4)(b)(ii) so long as there is some unresolved legal issue regarding discharge pursuant to the model statute
and an agency shop agreement. 2°7 Delay in the discharge of a defaulting
employee is accompanied by commensurate protection for the union.
Section 2(4)(b)(v) provides for compulsory authorization of the checkoff as a condition precedent to challenging the decision to terminate.
This guarantees the employee's ability to pay, as well as prompt
payment to the union, should the union be successful in the contest.
Moreover, the check-off during the course of the often lengthy litigation
contemplated in paragraph (iii) should to some degree guard against
frivolous or harassing claims against the union. By providing that the
objecting employee is not excused from paying the agency service fee
while suing to obtain relief, section 2(4)(b)(v), to some degree, embodies
the experience in the private sector.2 0 8 Section 2(4)(b) does not attempt
to apportion the costs of a section 2(4)(b)(iii) action among the parties.
Section 2(4)(b)(vi) permits rescission of the notice or decision to
terminate after default. It is in the best interests of all parties that differences be resolved during the "delay" periods of paragraphs (ii) or
(iv) without a formal determination by a commission, board, or court.
206 Smigel v. Southgate Community Sch. Dist., 70 L.R.R.M. 2042 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1968);
see text at notes 165-66 supra.
207 Section 2(4)(b)(iv) is patterned, in part, after the guarantees embodied in the
agency shop agreement in Smigel. 70 L.R.R.M. at 2043.
208 See Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship Clerks v. Allen, 373 US. 113, 120 (1963).
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However, the provisions of paragraph (vi) obligate the defaulting employee who elects to change his section 2(4) status to demonstrate his
good faith compliance with the terms and conditions of the model statute and an agency shop provision pursuant thereto. Moreover, section
2(4)(b)(vi) supports charging a defaulting employee coming within
its provisions with any reasonable costs incurred by the parties as a
result of the employee's decision initially to withhold payment of the
agency service fee.209
6. Section 2(5)(a)-A Voice for the Objecting Employee in Adoptingan Agency Shop Provision
Section 2(5)(a) incorporates into the model statute a referendum
provision similar to the one originally included in section 8(a)(3),
first proviso (ii), of the LMRA of 1947.210 In amending the Wagner Act

in 1947, Congress imposed the requirement, as a precondition to the
promulgation of a union security clause, that the employees of the
bargaining unit authorize the execution of such a clause in a secret
ballot election. In almost every election held by the NLRB under that
provision during the years 1947 to 1951 the employees voted overwhelmingly to authorize a union security clause; 211 as a result, the
voting requirement was repealed by the Taft-Humphrey amendments
in 1951.212
By including in section 2(5)(a) of the model statute a provision
requiring a referendum on the agency shop agreement, the model
statute defers to the position, similar to that voiced in 1947, that em213
ployees do not necessarily support compulsory payments to unions.
Because of the greater propensity for conflict between the agency shop
200 The model statute in § 2(4) is not intended to apply an exclusive procedure for

challenging the validity of either the model statute or an agency shop provision executed
pursuant thereto. If other state statutes provide a declaratory judgment procedure, for
example, an objecting employee may resort to it -so long as he is not in default for
purposes of § 2(4) of the model statute. See § 2(4)(b)(iii) (first proviso).
Section 2(4)(b) does not provide a remedy for a public employee who successfully
challenges the validity of an agency shop agreement. The successful employee seems
entitled to no more than the wages withheld under paragraph (v) while he litigated the
matter. See Brady v. TWA Inc., 196 F. Supp. 504 (D. Del. 1961) (sole remedy for an
employee wrongfully discharged under a Railway Labor Act union shop contract is back
pay; claim for damages for mental suffering and unforeseen expenses as well as punitive
damages rejected).
210 Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 140-41.
211 See Hogan, The Meaning of Union Shop Elections, 2 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 319,
322-23 (1949); Kuhn, Right-to-Work Laws-Symbols or Substance?, 14 IND. & LAB. REL.
Ray. 587, 592 (1961).
212

Act of October 22, 1951, ch. 534, 65 Stat. 601.

213 See

H. NoRTHRup & G. BLOOM,

GOVERNMENT AND LABOR

224-25 (1963).
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and both the statutory principles of collective bargaining and the civil
service concept of merit employment unique to the public sector, section 2(5)(a) is desirable in order to dispel any notion that an agency
shop agreement is not one supported by most public employees.
It is not certain that the individual preferences of public employees
will follow those experienced in the private sector between 1947 and
1951; the referendum provision is therefore necessary at least during
the early years. 214 Section 2(5)(a) lacks the original LMRA formal requirement of a majority vote, but would allow the board or commission
discretion in selecting the method of measuring the consensus. One
method might be the execution of authorization cards by a majority
of employees supporting the agency shop agreement.
7. Section 2(5)(b)-No Membership Obligationsunder the Model
Statute
Section 2(5)(b) limits the conditions of employment that may be
imposed by an agency shop agreement to payment of the agency service
fee; it precludes forcing an objecting employee to join the union, either
in law or in fact. In effect, section 2(5)(b) seeks to avoid the problems
21 and Wisassociated in private employment with the Allis-Chalmer
2 16 types of situations.
consin Motor Corp.
In Allis-Chalmers, nominal union membership was required only
2 17
to the extent that an employee pay his monthly dues. The Supreme
Court held that union disciplinary action through a fine (levied against
the employees for crossing a picket line) did not violate the national labor
policy as long as it did not affect the employees' employment rights.
In Wisconsin Motor Corp. a union security clause required as a condition of employment that the employee either become and remain a
member of the union after thirty days or decline membership and pay
an agency service fee.218 The Supreme Court in Wisconsin Motor Corp.
relied on its Allis-Chalmers opinion to find no violation of the national
labor policy when the union imposed fines on employees who elected
membership and who violated the union's piecework ceiling rules. As in
214 A similar referendum requirement has been incorporated into the agency shop
law governing the City of Boston. Ch. 835, [1969] Mass. Acts, in BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE
REL. RxP. No. 800: B-1 (June 9, 1969).The Wisconsin State Assembly recently approved a
bill authorizing agency shop agreements negotiated in the public sector if ratified by twothirds of the public employees in the unit. BNA Gov'T EMPLOYEE REL. REP. No. 85: B-11
(Feb. 9, 1970).
215 NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
216 Scofield v. NLR.B [Wisconsin Motor Corp.], 894 U.S. 428 (1969).
217 388 U.S. at 196.
218 894 U.S. at 424 n..
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Allis-Chalmers, the Court allowed enforcement of internal union rules
against a voluntary union member so long as the employer was not
induced "to use the emoluments of the job to enforce the union's
rules." 219 But the Court suggested that the result would be different if
the employees had opted for nonmembership; 220 in that case the only
power the union could exercise over the nonmember would be to cause
his discharge for failure to pay the service fee.
The Wisconsin Motor Corp. case presented the problem that the
Supreme Court in Allis-Chalmers reserved for future decision, i.e.,
whether the national labor policy is violated if unions "imposed fines
on members whose membership was in fact limited to the obligation
of paying monthly dues .... " 221 The cases illustrate, then, the fine line
in the extent of union control over employees (beyond causing the discharge for failure to fulfill a lawful union security requirement) which
is tenuously based on the implications of nominal union membership.
The prohibition of section 2(5)(b) protects an objecting public employee
from the pressures of internal union policy that an employee in the
private sector, under the rulings in Allis-Chalmers and Wisconsin
Motor Corp., may be subjected to because of a mere oath to the union.
Of course, nothing in section 2(5)(b) prevents an employee from voluntarily joining any union.
8. Section 2(5Xc)-Membership Discriminationand the Invalidity
of an Agency Shop
Finally, section 2(5)(c) simply assures that no public employee
union will receive financial support from public employees to whom
it denies membership generally available to others. In this respect the
model statute draws on similar language in the second proviso of
section 8(a)(3) of the Taft-Hartley Act.2 22
CONCLUSION

At a time when public employees increasingly are being granted
the right to negotiate collectively over their wages, hours, and conditions of employment, it seems both logical and desirable to expand this
right to include a right to union security. The agency shop is the most
acceptable form of union security compatible with the scheme of labor
relations in the public sector.
Id. at 428-29.
220 Id. at 435.
221 388 U.S. at 197.
222 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1964).
219

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 55:547

Like collective bargaining in general, however, the agency shop
has not received universal acceptance in the public sector. Union security often falls within the purview of local right-to-work legislation
and decisions or can be classed as requiring an unlawful delegation of
governmental authority.
An agency shop provision may be most safely promulgated within
the context of collective bargaining legislation for public employment.
Most such legislation, however, does not authorize bargaining over
union security in any form. If an analogy is made to the legislative
history of the federal statute for the private sector, the conspicuous
absence of any union security proviso in state legislation for public
employment could be determinative of the invalidity of such a provision. On the other hand, the agency shop may be acceptable if the
state statutes carry no legislative history reflecting a policy precluding
union security. The agency shop does not directly encourage union
membership but, in fact, prevents discouragement of membership in a
union that bargains on behalf of both member and nonmember employees. Under this interpretation of the statutes, a policy in favor of
union security is recognized, and only those forms requiring formal
membership as a condition of employment are prohibited.
The possibility of conflict between the agency shop and the civil
service concept of merit employment must be resolved before the parties can enjoy the benefits of union security. Where the legislature
requires the predominance of either the civil service rules or a collective
bargaining scheme, the problem of accommodation is, of course, foreclosed. But where the statutory language is ambiguous, there is reason
to believe that an agency shop arrangement can exist side by side with
the civil service operation.
On its face, the strict agency shop rule of discharge for failure to
pay a fee to the union does not run counter to the purpose of the
various civil service statutes regulating discharge in the public sector;
i.e., to prevent the arbitrary and politically motivated dismissal of
employees. Procedural safeguards in the civil service sense are essential,
however, to afford the objecting employee opportunity to contest the
validity of the agency shop and its application to him.
Limitations on the operation of an agency shop arrangement are
necessary to protect the public employee from onerous obligations.
Thus, a model agency shop statute from which an agency shop agreement can be derived is suggested. In drawing the line short of actual
union membership, the proposed scheme balances the individual employee's free agency against the requisite stability for the majority
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representative of public employees. And to the extent that the introducdon of such stability in public labor relations through the inclusion
of the agency shop promotes a commensurate diminution in the influence and operations of a civil service system for public employment,
the agency shop issue is only one aspect of the struggle to replace the
"paternalistic" concept of civil service employment with active involvement through collective bargaining.
Jay W. Waks

